Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 40, Issue 2

Article 1

The Quest for Justice: Joseph Kony and the
Lord’s Resistance Army
Christopher E. Bailey∗

∗

Copyright c by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley
Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

ARTICLE
THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: JOSEPH KONY & THE
LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY
Christopher E. Bailey1

I. A CALL FOR ACCOUNTABILITY .............................................248
II. THE UGANDA-LRA CONFLICT ...............................................251
A. A Short History of the Conflict ..........................................251
B. The Nature of the Criminal Offenses ..................................252
C. Ugandan Initiatives against the LRA ..................................255
d. Whither a Transnational Armed Conflict? ..........................260
III. CHARACTERIZING THE CONFLICT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ......................261
A. Introduction ........................................................................261
B. The Nature of the Conflict ..................................................264
C. The Combatant Status of LRA Members ...........................270
D. Assessment: The Scope of Combatant’s Privilege .............275
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER UGANDAN LAW ....................275
A. Introduction: Modernizing Ugandan Law and Practice......275
B. The Administration of Justice: Courts, Statutes, &
Issues .................................................................................276
C. Notable National Security Cases: Steps & Missteps ..........291
D. Traditional Acholi Reconciliation Practices: Necessary
but Not Sufficient ..............................................................302
E. Assessment: Willing, But Unable without Support ............304
1. Mr. Christopher E. Bailey is a faculty member at the National Intelligence University
specializing in national security law, processes, and intelligence ethics. He is a 1992 graduate
of the McGeorge School of Law and a 2008 graduate of the US Army War College. He has an
LLM degree in National Security & US Foreign Relations Law from the George Washington
University School of Law where he is currently a candidate for the SJD degree. All statements
of fact, analysis, or opinion are the author’s and do not reflect the official policy or position of
the National Intelligence University, the Department of Defense or any of its components, or
the US government.

247

248

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:2

V. ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW ...................................................................306
A. Introduction: Addressing the Scope of the Conflict ...........306
B. The Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court ....309
C. Alternative International Approaches in Constituting an
ICC Proceeding .................................................................316
D. A Recommended Way Forward: Closing an Impunity
Gap ....................................................................................322
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS ...................................................327
I. A CALL FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
Joseph Kony has earned the dubious moniker of the worst
human rights offender in Africa. The Lord’s Resistance Army
(“LRA”), led by Chairman Kony, waged a 28-year campaign of terror
ranging over a large swath of Central Africa and has led to the death,
injury and displacement of millions of people in northern Uganda,
southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”), and
the Central African Republic (“CAR”). 2 Although Kony initially
mounted a traditional rebellion against the central government in
Kampala, imposing a high cost on the Acholi region of northern
Uganda, his later attacks used terror tactics often launched from
sanctuary in either southern Sudan or the DRC.3 In fact, Kony’s later
2. The LRA originated in the ethnic Acholi districts of northern Uganda in the late
1980s. Initially, after the 1986 fall of Milton Obote’s government in Kampala, Alice
Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement and its military wing the Holy Spirit Mobile Force
(“HSMF”) emerged as an opposition group purporting to represent Acholi interests. Her
organization fell apart in 1987-88 and her nephew, Joseph Kony, eventually formed the LRA
with remnants of the HSMF. The LRA Crisis Tracker, managed by Invisible Children and
Resolve, both non-profit organizations dedicated to increasing awareness about the LRA
conflict, provide a useful resource for assessing Kony’s recent terror campaign. LRA CRISIS
TRACKER, available at http://www.lracrisistracker.com/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
3. Initially, the LRA could have been characterized as a rebel/insurgent group that used a
military-focus strategy, an approach that called for initial military action against government
targets and delayed political consolidation until final victory. BARD O’NEILL, INSURGENCY &
TERRORISM: INSIDE MODERN REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE 41–45 (2d ed. 2001). In 1994,
Kony made a major change of strategy, developing a support relationship with Sudan,
switching to terror tactics against the Acholi people, and abducting children. Sudan supplied
Kony with training, equipment, and sanctuary, likely as a proxy in its own fight against the
Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (“SPLM/A”) and probably because Ugandan
President Yoweri Museveni was supporting the SPLM/A. MAREIKE SCHOMERUS, THE
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terror campaign was a contributing factor to the 1998 to 2003 conflict
between Uganda and the DRC, which led to the 2005 judgment
against Uganda in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).4 Kony’s
campaign also brought increased attention to the LRA on the part of
the international community, to include regional governments, nongovernmental organizations, the United States, and the United
Nations, and its mission in the DRC.5
This article initially examines whether the Uganda-LRA conflict
is best characterized as a non-international armed conflict within the
meaning of the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions6 and
the 1977 Additional Protocol II. This conflict typology determination
has important consequences for assessing the nature of the offenses,
adjudicatory fora, and appropriate punishments. Indeed, to a certain
extent, the conflict could also be described as a transnational armed
conflict, in that the LRA has changed from a rebel group representing
Acholi interests in northern Uganda against the government in
Kampala, to a terror organization that has conducted large scale
rampages against innocent civilians and is currently fighting for its
existence in isolated areas of the DRC and southeastern CAR. Despite
its origins as a criminal organization responsible for wide-ranging
offenses under the Ugandan Penal Code, Kony’s LRA is probably

LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY IN SUDAN: A HISTORY AND OVERVIEW 24–33 (2007). Kony
turned against the Acholi people, likely because he blamed them for the LRA’s reverses,
initiating a systematic terror campaign against them. In any case, the switch from
rebel/insurgent to terror tactics destroyed his claim for moral or political legitimacy either in
northern Uganda or with the international human rights community. O’Neill describes this
kind of reciprocal relationship involving support to an opponent’s internal rebellion as a
“mirror image” problem. See id.
4. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo.
v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 167 (Dec. 19).
5. The UN Security Council has condemned the attacks on civilians, as well as the
human rights violations by the LRA in two separate resolutions. See S.C. Res. 1653, § 8 (Jan.
27, 2006); S.C. Res. 1663, § 7 (Mar. 24, 2006).
6. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
IV].
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best characterized as an “organized armed group” 7 with many
members subject to prosecution for serious crimes under domestic
law, as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity under
international humanitarian, for a wide range of offenses. 8 While
Uganda does not come to the table with clean hands, neither can its
alleged crimes be compared with the widespread atrocities committed
by the LRA; nonetheless, the obligations of international
humanitarian law (“IHL”) apply equally to both sides of the conflict.
The interests of justice will, no doubt, require an equally broad range
of legal responses.
This article raises important questions about how the
international community can assist African governments in achieving
accountability for jus in bello (war crimes) violations—accountability
that would be widely perceived as legitimate by the affected peoples
and thereby further the long-term interests of international peace and
security. This article argues that Ugandan criminal law, to include its
7. The 1977 Additional Protocol II applies to conflicts “which take place in the territory
of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part
of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to
implement this Protocol.” Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 1, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.S.T. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. Uganda’s accession to Additional Protocol II
was effective Sept. 13, 1991. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/ (last visited June 19, 2015). By its terms under Article II, Additional
Protocol II does not apply to a range of internal disturbances, which raises an issue regarding
the demarcation between a law enforcement problem and a non-international armed conflict.
The 1977 Additional Protocol I applies to international armed conflicts, or conflicts between
two or more states, as well as “armed conflicts which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of
self-determination. . . .” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 1(4), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. Uganda’s accession to Additional Protocol I was effective
September 13, 1991. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, supra. However, there has
been no claim that Kony is fighting against colonial domination, an alien occupation, or a
racist regime in Kampala.
8. Uganda still recognizes the death penalty for serious crimes, despite international
pressure to eliminate the practice. The Uganda Penal Code Act of June 15, 1950 imposes the
death penalty for a wide range of offenses, including treason, rape, murder, the defilement of a
girl under the age of 18, and kidnapping. Uganda has ratified the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) of December 19, 1966, but not the Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that seeks to abolish the
death penalty. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, available at
http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited June 15, 2015).
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penal statutes, the Amnesty Law, and the 2006 legislation that created
a War Crimes Court, have significant shortcomings that would
preclude effective accountability for the full range of offenses.9 This
article further argues that the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)
cannot—for a range of jurisdictional and substantive reasons—
provide an effective forum for adjudicating the range of offenses
committed in this conflict. This article concludes that the ICC should
establish an agreement-based (i.e., a treaty) hybrid tribunal to
prosecute war crimes committed over the course of the Uganda-LRA
conflict from 1987 to the present.
II. THE UGANDA-LRA CONFLICT
A. A Short History of the Conflict
The insurgency in northern Uganda has its roots in the
marginalization of certain ethnic groups in the northern districts after
President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance
Movement/Army (“NRM/A”) came to power in 1986.10 The NRM/A
was touted as an alternative to multi-party democracy and was based
in southern Uganda. At first, both politically and spiritually motivated
resistance groups opposed the southern-dominated NRM. The LRA
then emerged in 1987, initially claiming to be fighting to free the
Acholi people of northern Uganda by overthrowing the Ugandan
government and installing a regime governed by Kony’s
interpretation of the Ten Commandments. 11 Around 1992 to 1994,
Kony turned against the Acholi, who he apparently blamed for the
LRA’s reverses, initiating a systematic terror campaign against
them.12 In fact, the Acholi refer to the LRA as “Otong tong,” meaning
“cut” in the Luo dialect, with the implication that the LRA mutilated
people.13
9. ICC Bill: Why did MPs trap Museveni and save Kony?, INDEPENDENT (Kampala),
Mar. 31, 2010, allafrica.com/stories/201003310540.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2015).
10. ROBERT GERSONY, THE ANGUISH OF NORTHERN UGANDA: RESULTS OF A FIELDBASED ASSESSMENT OF THE CIVIL CONFLICTS IN NORTHERN UGANDA (1997), available at
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacc245.pdf.
11 . OPIYIO OLOYA, CHILD TO SOLDIER: STORIES FROM JOSEPH KONY’S LORD’S
RESISTANCE ARMY 58 (2013).
12. Id. at 63-64.
13. In fact, LRA brutality was often symbolic, such as cutting off ears or lips as a
warning to others against cooperating with the Government of Uganda (“GoU”). Ruddy Doom
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Since 1994 the LRA’s terror campaign has targeted Ugandan
civilians, Uganda People’s Defence Force (“UPDF”) units, Sudanese
civilians living near the Ugandan border, Sudanese People’s
Liberation Army fighters, and international personnel working in
LRA affected areas. This terror campaign alienated many Acholi.
Finally, Kony proceeded to abduct children as recruits so that his
group could form the nucleus of a new Acholi identity. Indeed, Kony
achieved international notoriety for his widespread practice of
abducting children, typically forcing young boys to become soldiers
and awarding young girls as wives to his officers.
B. The Nature of the Criminal Offenses
This long-standing and wide ranging conflict has resulted in a
range of IHL claims against both the LRA and the UPDF. In some
cases, the LRA members and UPDF soldiers have reportedly violated
the Ugandan Criminal Code, while in other cases there have been
reports of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed against
civilians. Nonetheless, Kony and his senior leaders likely bear
primary (command) responsibility for much of the criminal
behavior.14 In any case, although the available information indicates
that Kony and others may have committed the serious crimes of
which they are accused, a fair trial by an impartial tribunal is needed
to test the reliability of this information, to determine whether proper
evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and if so to
determine the appropriate sentence.
Kony and the senior leadership of the LRA have been accused of
widespread and continuing violations of IHL. The LRA is likely
responsible for a wide range of criminal acts, crimes against

and Koen Vlassenrot, Kony’s Message: A New Koine? AFRICAN AFF. (Jan. 1, 1999),
http://truth_addict.blogspot.com/2012/03/african-affairs-1999-konys-message-new.html.
14. Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kony and his leaders
would be criminally responsible for the acts of subordinates in that they “either knew or,
owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing or
about to commit such crimes,” and “failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.” See Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, art. 28 (July 7, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Uganda
ratified the Rome Statute on June 14, 2002. UN Treaty Collection, available at
https://treaties.un.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2015).
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humanity, and war crimes over the past twenty-seven years.15 These
crimes include the murder, abduction, rape, and mutilation of untold
numbers of people, creating a reign of terror in northern Uganda that
lasted over twenty years and left almost two million persons displaced
from their homes. In addition, there is credible evidence that the LRA
engaged in the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines, likely
supplied by Sudan.16 Later, after the UPDF attacked the LRA camps
in December of 2008, the LRA resumed its terror campaign against
civilians largely west and away from Uganda, through parts of the
DRC, the CAR and southern Sudan. 17 The Government of Uganda
(“GoU”), various non-government organizations, and the ICC have
amassed significant evidence of these crimes, as well as Kony’s
responsibility for much—if not all—of the staggering human cost that
has resulted from this conflict.18
The Ugandan security forces, including both the UPDF and the
Ugandan Police, have also been accused of a range of criminal
offenses in northern Uganda over the past twenty-five years. It is not
clear, however, whether any of the claimed offenses rise to the level
15. Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, the crime against humanity “means any of the
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:” murder, extermination, enslavement,
imprisonment, torture, rape, and other specified acts. There is a wealth of evidence that Kony
and his senior leaders have planned and directed widespread acts against the civilian
populations of a four-nation region over a protracted period of time. See Rome Statute, supra
note 14. Under Article 8 of the statute, war crimes are defined as grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, as well as “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international
armed conflict. . . .” Id.
16 . AVSI, MINE RISK EDUCATION AND VICTIM SUPPORT IN NORTHERN UGANDA,
REPORT (Aug. 31, 2005), http://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/mine-risk-education-and-victimsupport-northern-uganda. This reliable report indicates that unmarked anti-personnel mines
were often used to target civilians with emplacement near villages, water sources, and foot
paths. Such usage violates the basic IHL principles of necessity, distinction, and
proportionality; anti-personnel mines have long been considered problematic because innocent
civilians can be injured long after military forces and rebels have departed an area. This leads
to the question of where the mines came from: either the mines were planted by the UPDF or
were supplied to the rebels by another country, such as Sudan. In any case, both Uganda and
Sudan have ratified the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (the Ottawa Treaty); Uganda
ratified the treaty on February 25, 1999 and Sudan ratified it on October 13, 2003. See UN
Treaty Collection, available at https://treaties.un.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2015).
17 . See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE CHRISTMAS MASSACRE: LRA ATTACKS ON
CIVILIANS IN NORTHERN CONGO (2009).
18. ICC, Case Information Sheet, The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, and
Okot Odhiambo (2015) ICC-02/04-01/05, https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/kony/Documents/
KonyEtAlEng.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
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of war crimes, much less “grave breaches” or crimes against
humanity, at least within the context of a Common Article 3 noninternational armed conflict. In general terms, the Ugandan security
forces have been accused of using child soldiers,19 the detention and
use of children for intelligence gathering purposes,20 and the herding
of the Acholi population into displaced persons camps where they
were subjected to difficult living conditions.21
Arguably, some government actions could be justified under the
principle of military necessity, while other actions—at least at the
individual level—could be described as criminal actions punishable
19. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STOLEN CHILDREN: ABDUCTION AND RECRUITMENT IN
NORTHERN UGANDA 15 (Mar. 2003), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0303/uganda
0403.pdf (last visited June 15, 2015). Human Rights Watch reports that the UPDF has, at least
in the past, recruited children for local defense units and to fight the LRA. Uganda’s 2002
Declaration on Ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict provides: “The Government of the
Republic of Uganda declares that the minimum age for the recruitment of persons into the
armed forces is by law set at eighteen (18) years. Recruitment is entirely and squarely
voluntary and is carried out with the full informed consent of the persons being recruited.
There is no conscription in Uganda.” See UN Treaty Collection, available at
https://treaties.un.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2015). In addition, the 2005 UPDF Act, Article 52
(c) sets the minimum age for military recruitment as “at least 18 years of age.” Id.
20 . CHILD SOLDIERS INTERNATIONAL, CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT (2008),
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/pub/2008/children/Child_Soldiers_Global_Report_Summary.pdf.
Recent reports indicate that the UPDF once had 1,130 child soldiers in its ranks, although the
UPDF notes that it can be difficult to know someone’s actual age (i.e., the lack of birth
certificates). CHILD SOLDIERS INTERNATIONAL, LOUDER THAN WORDS – AN AGENDA FOR
ACTION TO END STATE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS (2012).
21. Patrick Wegner, A Genocide in Northern Uganda – The ‘Protected Camps’ Policy of
1999 to 2006, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT, https://justiceinconflict.org/2012/04/09/a-genocide-innorthern-uganda-the-protected-camps-policy-of-1999-to-2006/ (last visited June 16, 2015).
Some writers have described the camps policy as crimes against humanity, inhumane acts, or
even genocide, but these claims are probably overstated especially since the Genocide
Convention requires a specific intent to eliminate an ethnic or racial group and there is no
evidence to that effect. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, art. 2, 9 (December 1984) (Uganda’s accession was effective on Nov. 14, 1995),
UN Treaty Collection, available at https://treaties.un.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2015)
[hereinafter The Genocide Convention]. In any case, while the government moved people into
the camps as a security measure against the LRA, it also provided minimal services and
eventually received considerable support from the international community. According to the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the camp population peaked in 2005 with 1.84 million
people in 241 camps. And, since most people have now returned to their original homes, the
UNHCR closed its office in northern Uganda in 2012. UNHCR closes chapter on Uganda’s
internally displaced people, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (Jan. 6,
2012),
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2012/1/4f06e2a79/unhcr-closes-chapterugandas-internally-displaced-people.html.
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under the Ugandan Penal Code. For example, there is considerable
practical merit, if not military necessity, to permitting the use of
teenage boys to defend their own homes/villages or to using recently
escaped children to help track down their former abductors. And
historically, the movement of population groups into protected camps
has been seen as a very effective way of “draining the swamp” against
rebel groups trying to exploit them. 22 Nevertheless, many of these
tactics may violate the law. Regardless, in order to advance long-term
peace and security in northern Uganda, all criminal activity—whether
committed by LRA soldiers or Ugandan security forces—should be
investigated and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. While the
ICC has indicated that it would investigate complaints against the
UPDF, the court noted that it lacked jurisdiction since most alleged
criminal acts had reportedly occurred prior to the July 2002 entry into
force of the Rome Statute.23 Nonetheless, the court has not released
any reports or filed any indictments against government personnel,
even for offenses post-dating July 1, 2002.
C. Ugandan Initiatives against the LRA
Uganda has pursued important legal initiatives in its fight against
the LRA. In 1999 Uganda and Sudan signed the Nairobi Agreement,
which committed the two countries to cease hostilities against each
other and to end support to any rebel groups operating from each
other’s territory.24 In January of 2000 President Museveni signed an
Amnesty Act into law that has reportedly induced 26,000 rebels to

22. The phrase “draining the swamp” refers to the practice of moving population groups
from a conflict area, in an effort to separate insurgents/guerrillas from any base of popular
support. While this practice can help identify rebels who may be hiding among the civilians
and to focus combat operations against them, it can also be counterproductive in terms of
encouraging popular disaffection from the government, especially if the move is made in a
heavy-handed manner or essential services are not provided. See, for example, the British
experience in Malaya during the 1950s. See JOHN A. NAGL, LEARNING TO EAT SOUP WITH A
KNIFE: COUNTERINSURGENCY LESSONS FROM MALAYA AND VIETNAM (2002).
23. Samson Ntale, ICC to investigate Ugandan army, CNN (June 3, 2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/06/03/uganda.army.icc/. In fact, ICC prosecutor
Luis Moreno-Ocampo indicated that any allegations of UPDF offenses pre-dating July 1, 2002
should be taken before Uganda’s High Court. Id.
24. Paul Jackson, The March of the Lord’s Resistance Army: Greed or Grievance in
Northern Uganda?, SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 13 (2002).
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defect to the GoU.25 This law provides amnesty for “any Ugandan
who has at any time since the 26th day of January 1986 engaged in or
is engaging in war or armed rebellion against the government of the
Republic of Uganda . . . .”26 In March of 2002 Uganda and Sudan also
signed a bilateral protocol that allowed the UPDF to conduct crossborder operations against the LRA camps in southern Sudan, further
increasing the pressure on the rebels.27
In December of 2003, Uganda initiated an important legal effort
by referring the situation involving the LRA to the ICC. A remarkable
move on Uganda’s part, this referral was the first state referral of an
action to the ICC. The referral was also significant because it
involved offenses within a non-international armed conflict; the
referral focused international attention on Kony and his senior
lieutenants. Under the Rome Statute, the ICC has subject matter
jurisdiction over natural persons involving four crimes: genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.28
25. Undermining the LRA: Role of Uganda’s Amnesty Act, CONCILIATION RESOURCES
(Aug. 2012), http://www.c-r.org/news-and-views/comment/undermining-lra-role-ugandasamnesty-act (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). See Additional Protocol II, supra note 6, art. 6(5)
(encouraging authorities in power “to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who
participated in the armed conflict”). See also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary
International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I: Rules, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (2005) (Rule 139
recognizes a rule of customary international law urging states to extend amnesty to participants
in a non-international armed conflict, except where the person is suspected of a war crime).
26. This statute allows a “reporter” seeking amnesty to receive a certificate of amnesty
in exchange for renouncing and abandoning involvement in war or armed rebellion. The
Amnesty Act (2000) (Uganda), Part II § 3(1). In addition, the statute creates an Amnesty
Commission to manage the demobilization, reintegration, and resettlement of reporters. The
amnesty process has been controversial, with periodic charges that it allows criminally
culpable persons to escape prosecution and accountability. In 2006, the Uganda Parliament
amended the act to provide that a person would be ineligible for a grant of amnesty “if he or
she is declared not eligible by the Minister by statutory instrument made with the approval of
Parliament.” The Amnesty (Amendment) Act (2006) (Uganda). Part II (the amnesty
provisions) lapsed on May 23, 2012, but was reenacted in its original form in May 2013. See
Statutory Instruments (2012) No. 34, The Amnesty Act (Declaration of Lapse of the Operation
of Part II) Instrument (2012); Ugandan Government Renews Amnesty Policy//IC Citizen,
INVISIBLE CHILDREN, http://invisiblechildren.com/blog/2013/05/30/ugandan-governmentrenews-amnesty-policy-ic-citizen/ (last visited June 12, 2015).
27 . Army happy with Sudan protocol on LRA, IRIN NEWS (Mar. 19, 2002),
http://www.irinnews.org/news/2002/03/19/army-happy-sudan-protocol-lra (last visited Jan. 12,
2017).
28. Rome Statute, supra note 14. Under Article 12 and 13, the ICC has jurisdiction only
if the offenses were committed on the territory of a state party, by a state party or one its
nationals, or under referral by the UN Security Council.

2017]

THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: KONY & THE LRA

257

The court has jurisdiction over war crimes “when committed as part
of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such
crimes,” but only for crimes committed after the statute came into
effect in July 2002.29
Subsequently, in September of 2005, the ICC issued arrest
warrants against Joseph Kony and four of his senior leaders 30 for
crimes against humanity and war crimes. 31 Later, after the 2008
breakdown in peace negotiations between Kony and the GoU, the
indictments would help provide the GoU with a political condition
precedent for renewed military action against the LRA. Finally, on
May 25, 2010, the Ugandan parliament adopted the International
Criminal Court Act, 32 a statute that allows for the prosecution of
international crimes in Uganda and cooperation between the GoU and
the ICC.33
Uganda has also pursued significant political-military initiatives
with the LRA that have changed the nature of the conflict. In
29. Id. art. 8. Article 8 (e) (vii) also defines the “[c]onscripting or enlisting children
under the age of fifteen into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in
hostilities” as a serious violation of the laws and customs of war in non-international armed
conflict.
30. Vincent Otti (later executed on Kony’s orders in 2007), Raska Lakwena (later killed
by Ugandan forces in 2006), Okot Odhiambo (LRA deputy commander and still at large), and
Dominic Ongwen (recently captured by US forces and pending trial at The Hague).
31. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony
Issued on July 8, 2005, as Amended on Sept. 27, 2005; Prosecutor v. Kony (July 8, 2005) Case
No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Vincent Otti; Prosecutor v. Kony (July 8, 2005)
Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Raska Lakwena Issued; Prosecutor v. Kony
(July 8, 2005) Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Okot Odhiambo; Prosecutor
v. Kony (July 8, 2005) Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Dominic Ongwen.
According to the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II (July 11, 2007) No. ICC-02/04-01/05-248,
the proceedings against Lakwena have been terminated based upon reliable evidence that he
was killed on August 12, 2006. The warrants are available on the International Criminal Court
website, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Home.aspx. The warrant against Vincent
Otti is apparently still valid, even though the LRA has confirmed his death. Uganda’s LRA
Confirm Otti Death, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/7204278.stm. On February 16, 2015, Pre-Trial Chamber II severed the proceedings
against Ongwen from the remaining co-defendants. ICC, Case Information Sheet, The
Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen (Mar. 26, 2015) Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, https://www.icccpi.int/uganda/ongwen/Documents/ OngwenEng.pdf.
32. The International Criminal Court Act (2010).
33. James Ellis & Dan Kuwali, Uganda, 2011 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW 14,
Correspondents’ Reports (indicating that there are several notable omissions from the 2010
ICC Act, including conduct that was not a crime at the time of its commission, a lack of
provisions on retroactivity, and rules of international law, including IHL, that raise questions
about fair trial standards).
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September 2005, as a result of negotiations, LRA elements moved
into camps in the northeastern DRC and suspended military
operations.34 Effectively, this brought about a de facto end to the noninternational armed conflict in northern Uganda and the peace there
that lasts to this day. In August of 2006 the LRA and the GoU signed
a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the parties participated in
peace talks.35
In one important effort, the peace delegates signed an Agreement
on Accountability and Reconciliation. 36 This effort resulted in
agreement to try serious offenses through formal Ugandan justice
measures with lesser offenses handled through traditional
reconciliation practices. In part, this agreement was intended to meet
the complementary requirements of the Rome Statute, perhaps
providing a way for Uganda to procure the withdrawal of the ICC
indictments.37 Kony sent a delegation to negotiate on his behalf, but
he repeatedly failed to appear in person at announced peace
conferences, much less sign the negotiated Final Peace Agreement in
November 2008. 38 Many people questioned whether Kony was
negotiating in good faith, believing that he never intended to give up
his fight; others, however, believed that Kony would sign a peace
agreement but only if the ICC first withdrew the indictments.39 Thus,
even though Kony and his senior leaders may have refused to sign
because the pending indictments were not or could not be withdrawn,
it is also hard to fault the ICC for not doing so as a condition
precedent to any peace agreement. Nonetheless, after Kony failed to
34. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 17.
35 . LRA-Government Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Uganda—The Lord’s
Resistance Army, Aug. 26, 2006. The parties agreed “to cease all hostile military action aimed
at each other and any other action that may undermine the Peace Talks,” with the LRA
assembling in camps in southern Sudan, and agreed that any disputes arising under the
agreement “shall be resolved by the Mediation Team.” In June 2008 the LRA reportedly
attacked civilians in southern Sudan, leading the UPDF attack to plan attacks against the LRA
camps near Garamba National Park. Ugandan Rebels ‘Prepare for War,’ BBC NEWS AFRICA
(June 6, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7440790.stm.
36. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Uganda - The Lord’s Resistance
Army (June 29, 2007).
37. See generally Eric S. Fish, Comment, Peace Through Complementarity: Solving the
Ex Post Problem in International Criminal Court Prosecutions, 119 YALE L. J. 1703 (2010).
38. Mark Tran, Ugandan Rebel Leader Fails to Sign Peace Deal, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7,
2008), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/11/uganda.
39. Mark Kersten, Peace, Justice and Politics in Northern Uganda, EUR. COUNCIL
FOREIGN AFF. (2013), http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/IJP_Uganda.pdf.
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sign the agreement, Uganda went forward with its efforts to
implement the Juba talks to include establishing the International War
Crimes Division as a special division of the Ugandan High Court.40
Eventually, Uganda resumed military operations against him and
his organization.41 In December of 2008, the UPDF—with permission
from the DRC—conducted a joint air-ground attack, known as
Operation Lightning Thunder, 42 on the LRA’s base camps near
Garamba National Park. 43 While the initial attack was marginally
successful, it also resulted in a diversion of the LRA activities over a
much larger area of Northern DRC and into the CAR (namely, west
and largely away from northern Uganda).44 In 2012, as a result of the
40. Kristy McNamara, Seeking Justice in Ugandan Courts: Amnesty and the Case of
Thomas Kwoyelo, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 653, 658 (2013).
41. The 1907 Hague Regulations address military-to-military armistice agreements. On
one hand, Article 40 provides that “[a]ny serious violation of the armistice by one of the
parties gives the other party the right of denouncing it, and even, in cases of urgency, of
recommencing hostilities immediately.” On the other hand, perfidy, that is acts inviting an
adversary’s detrimental reliance on a protected status, has been a traditional concern under
IHL. See Sean Watts, Law-of-War Perfidy, 219 MIL. L. REV. 106 (2014). Here, it is clear that
the LRA committed a material breach of the original agreement, both in terms of its renewed
attacks in southern Sudan and with the movement to new camps near Garamba National Park.
Nonetheless, Uganda did make further attempts to negotiate with Kony through November
2008 before launching Operation Lightning Thunder. Hence, it would be difficult to argue that
the UPDF committed an act of perfidy with its December attack on the camps.
42 . The Ugandan-led operation included both Sudanese and Congolese soldiers in
support. Richard Downie, The Lord’s Resistance Army, CTR. STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD.
(2001), http://csis.org/publication/lords-resistance-army. Arguably, the Uganda-DRC bilateral
political relationship has been the strategic center of gravity in renewed fight against Kony and
the changed relationship (from the 1998-2003 period) has been a positive and enduring
development.
43. Garamba National Park has been a Congolese park since 1938 under the
management authority of the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation (“ICCN”) and has
been on the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) World
Heritage list since 1980. The park “contains the last worldwide population of the northern
white rhinoceros, endemic sub-species of Congolese giraffe and a mixed population of
elephants, combining forest elephants, bush elephants and individuals demonstrating
morphological characteristics common to the two elephant sub-species.” Garamba National
Park, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/136list/136 (last visited Feb. 19, 2015).
Reportedly, LRA members have poached a range of animals while in search of food. Poaching
Onslaught in Garamba National Park, AFRICA GEOGRAPHIC (June 13, 2014),
http://africageographic.com/blog/poaching-onslaught-in-garamba-national-park/ (last visited
Jan. 12, 2017). In that sense, LRA members may have committed war crimes involving
cultural property within the meaning of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.
44. Ledio Cakaj, On the Heels of Kony: The Untold Tragedy Unfolding in the Central
African Republic, ENOUGH PROJECT (June 24, 2010), http://www.enoughproject.
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deteriorating regional situation, the United States deployed special
operations forces to Obo, in southeastern CAR, to assist with efforts
to capture Kony and his lieutenants. 45 Overall, Uganda’s actions
reignited the earlier conflict in a new area and had a significant
impact on previously unaffected and innocent people. Recently,
Ongwen, one of Kony’s indicted lieutenants, surrendered to US
forces, renewing the prospect for an international crimes tribunal that
might help bring justice to some of his victims.46 Nevertheless, even
with President Museveni’s efforts to involve the ICC in the fight
against the LRA, he has still questioned the utility of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, as well as the ICC itself, in this conflict with Kony.47
d. Whither a Transnational Armed Conflict?
In sum, what began as a non-international armed conflict (a
rebellion) in northern Uganda has become a regional conflict
affecting millions of people in a four-country area of Central Africa; a
conflict that has drawn in members of the international community to
include the United States, France (in terms of support to the
Government of the CAR), the UN Mission in the DRC, and the ICC.
Thus, this conflict can now be considered an internationalized noninternational armed conflict, or a transnational armed conflict, at least
through the period of 2006 to 2008.48 While this article focuses on
ensuring accountability, we must first examine the nature of the
conflict and the combatant status of LRA members before turning to
the issue of how to achieve that accountability. Indeed, the extent to
org/publications/heels-of-joseph-kony-commander-of-lords-resistance-army (last visited Jan.
12, 2017).
45. Jeffrey Gettleman, In Vast Jungle, U.S. Troops Aid in Search for Kony, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/world/africa/kony-tracked-by-us-forcesin-central-africa.html?pagewanted=all.
46. LRA Rebel Dominic Ongwen Surrenders to U.S. Forces in CAR, BBC NEWS AFRICA
(Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30705649.
47. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, State of the Nation Address by President of the Republic
of Uganda Kampala, State House of Uganda (June 5, 2014), transcript available at
www.statehouse.go.ug/media/presidential-statements/2014/06/05/state-nation-address-heyoweri-kaguta-museveni-president-re). See also Jeffrey Gettleman, Senior Rebel from Uganda
to Be Moved to The Hague, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/14/
world/africa/ugandan-rebel-commander-to-be-tried-at-international-criminal-court.html.
48. The term “transnational armed conflict” has no legal significance; the term is not part
of international humanitarian law. The term reflects the fact that the conflict has the nature of
both an international and a non-international armed conflict.
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which the conflict can be characterized as either a non-international or
an international armed conflict, to include whether LRA members
have combatant status, has important bearing on whether such
members can be held accountable for certain offenses under IHL.
III. CHARACTERIZING THE CONFLICT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
A. Introduction
The nature of the conflict with the LRA affects national
obligations under IHL. The 1949 Geneva Conventions created a
bifurcated framework, providing for protections in either international
(Common Article 2) or non-international (Common Article 3) armed
conflicts. At that time, the drafters were focused primarily on
international armed conflict and viewed non-international armed
conflict primarily in terms of a rebellion or civil war within a single
country. 49 Still, the 1949 Geneva Conventions afforded major
improvements in the legal protection of victims of international
conflicts—wars between sovereign nations, while providing limited
protections to non-combatants in non-international armed conflict.50
Critically, for the purposes of the Uganda-LRA conflict, Common
Article 3 provided a less expansive—and less clear—set of
protections for the wounded and sick, prisoners of war, and civilians
than it did for Common Article 2 conflicts. Eventually, the
international community addressed this gap in international law with
the 1977 Additional Protocol (“AP”) II.51 AP II was designed to make
international humanitarian law more complete and universal, and to
provide expanded obligations in a non-international armed conflict.
The Uganda-LRA conflict raises important issues regarding the
applicability of domestic and international humanitarian law: the
49. GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL
APPROACH 45 (2012).
50. Under Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, an international armed
conflict is defined as a “declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise between two
or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them.” Common Article 3 applies “[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties. . . .” See supra note
6.
51. See AP II, supra note 7.
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conflict began in northern Uganda, involving some level of criminal
activity (e.g., internal disturbances, rebellion, or insurgency), clearly
raising issues under the Ugandan Penal Code, and yet the conflict also
has expanded and evolved to include large sections of Sudan, the
DRC, and the CAR. This raises controversial questions, at least in
certain areas of northern Uganda and during certain periods, regarding
the use of deadly force by UPDF in response to certain LRA
activities: at what point did the conflict transition from a law
enforcement problem to a non-international armed conflict warranting
the application of the IHL? 52 In effect, what began as internal
disturbances evolved into some level of a non-international armed
conflict, and eventually spread into a transnational armed conflict.53
Thus, this conflict raises several important issues regarding the
applicability of different IHL norms. Among these are the definition
of non-international armed conflict, the difference between
52 . Under general principles of international human rights law (a law enforcement
paradigm), the UPDF and the Uganda Police would have been limited in the use of deadly
force based upon a conduct-based standard (e.g., imminent threat to others) for targeting LRA
members, while the IHL can permit a broader, status-based standard. In any case, The Basic
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (“BPUFF”),
adopted by the UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Aug.
27 to Sep. 7, 1990, provides a minimum standard for Ugandan law enforcement operations
under international human rights law. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER, BASIC PRINCIPLES ON THE USE OF FORCE AND FIREARMS BY LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS (1990), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Use
OfForceAndFirearms.aspx. This standard is based in part on the ICCPR, and clearly envisions
the use of graduated force, with a presumption that law enforcement officers, as well as
military personnel conducting law enforcement operations, can use deadly force to respond to
imminent threats. See ICCPR, supra note 8.
53. A nation, such as Uganda, is often reluctant to recognize that a domestic situation has
changed from a law enforcement problem to one involving the use of armed forces subject to
the constraints of IHL. In part, a nation may be reluctant to admit to an inability to enforce its
own laws with an implicit invitation for international scrutiny over its actions, as well as those
of its adversary; in part, a nation may also believe that an acknowledgement regarding the
application of IHL also carries an implicit political recognition of the adversary’s status.
Andrew J. Carswell, Classifying the Conflict: A Soldier’s Dilemma, 91 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS, 143, 150 (2009). Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions provides: “The
application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the conflict.” See
supra note 5. Moreover, Additional Protocol II, Article 3 (1), provides: “Nothing in this
Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a state or the
responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and
order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State.” See AP
II, supra note 7, art. 3 (1). This section clearly indicates that a State can recognize the
application of AP II to its internal armed conflict without making an implicit recognition of the
sovereignty demands of dissident armed forces or an opposing organized armed group. Id.
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combatants and civilians (i.e., what constitutes an organized armed
group) and when a civilian can be considered to be engaged in “direct
participation in hostilities.” This discussion leads directly to the
question whether the LRA members can be held accountable for all
offenses committed in violation of Ugandan law, or whether the GoU
would voluntarily extend combatant’s privilege to the killing of
UPDF soldiers and other government employees.
The LRA conflict has spread over four Central African nations,
each of which has different obligations under IHL. Uganda has been a
state party to the Geneva Conventions since 1964 and ratified AP II in
1991.54 This means that Common Article 3, as well as the additional
protections under the AP II, have possible application to its internal
conflict with the LRA.55 Sudan, the DRC, and the CAR are also state
parties to the Geneva Conventions and APs I and II, but each with
different accession/ratification dates.56 The critical point here is that
Common Article 2 could be applicable to the Sudan, at least to the
extent that Sudan used the LRA as a proxy in its fight against
Uganda’s support to the Sudan People's Liberation Army (“SPLA”)
and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (“SPLM”).
The Rome Statute has incomplete reach over the range of
offenses committed in this conflict. Uganda, Sudan, the DRC, and the
CAR have all signed the Rome Statute, although Sudan later
withdrew in 2008.57 In any case, the Rome Statute did not come into
54. AP II, supra note 7.
55. See id. AP II would not, however, be applicable to the first three or four years of the
conflict involving the HSMF/emergent LRA, that is until the date that the protocol became
effective against Uganda. See AP II, supra note 7. Many provisions of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, as well as parts of AP II, would be considered binding upon Uganda as
customary international law. See id.
56. Sudan’s accession to the Geneva Conventions was effective on March 23, 1985, but
its accession to AP I was not effective until September 7, 2006 and its accession to AP II was
not effective until January 13, 2007. See supra note 7. The DRC’s succession to the Geneva
Conventions was effective on June 30, 1960 and its accession to both AP I and AP II were
effective on January 13, 2007. Id. The CAR’s succession to the Geneva Conventions was
effective on July 23, 1996, and its accessions to AP I and AP II were effective on January 17,
2005. See United Nations Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Home.aspx (last
visited Feb. 3, 2015). This means that Common Article 3 and AP II are both applicable to
most, but not all periods and areas, of the Uganda-LRA conflict.
57. Sudan signed the Rome Statute on September 8, 2000, but later withdrew on August
26, 2008 with the following note to the UN Secretary General: “Sudan does not intend to
become a party to the Rome Statute. Accordingly, Sudan has no legal obligation arising from
its signature on 8 September 2000.” The DRC’s ratification occurred on May 3, 2004 and the
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effect until July of 2002, making it inapplicable for the first fifteen
years of the LRA’s existence. Critically, for the interests of justice
and accountability, this means that many early war crimes committed
by either the LRA and the UPDF (or potentially other parties) cannot
be addressed through the ICC. While the LRA-Uganda conflict did
range over part of what is now the independent Republic of South
Sudan, Juba did not gain its independence from Sudan until July of
2011, long after the LRA departed its territory.58
B. The Nature of the Conflict
One initial problem to seeking accountability involves the
definition of a non-international armed conflict, and how this affects
the legal obligations of the parties to that conflict.59 In effect, there are
two types of non-international armed conflict in IHL. Common
Article 3 applies to an “armed conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties,” without further qualification. Yet, AP II applies to armed
conflicts that “take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups which, under responsible command exercise
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this
Protocol.”60 This leads to the issue whether the LRA qualifies as an
“organized armed group”—with territorial control—triggering the
application of AP II. In any case, Common Article 3 provides the
minimum standards for humanitarian treatment applicable during
armed conflict, with AP II imposing additional requirements on
signatory countries and “organized armed groups” that exercise
territorial control.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”) has held that “armed conflict of a non-international
character may only arise when there is protracted violence between
CAR’s ratification occurred on October 3, 2001. See United Nations Treaty Collection, supra
note 56.
58 . South Sudan Country Profile, BBC NEWS AFRICA, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-africa-14069082.
59. See generally Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, How is the term “Armed Conflict”
defined in international humanitarian law?, ICRC OPINION PAPER (Mar. 2008).
60. AP II, supra note 7.
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governmental authorities and organised armed groups, or between
such groups, within a State.”61 In fact, the ICTY has elaborated on the
intensity of the “protracted armed violence” required and has
developed a robust list of factors that can be used in a totality of the
circumstances test.62 Likewise, the ICTY has also elaborated on the
second requirement involving a conflict with an “organized armed
group.” 63 On one hand, the Ugandan government was faced with
internal civil strife and “banditry,” meaning that the Uganda Penal
Code applies in all parts of the country, whether or not IHL overlays
on that or not, for certain situations. On the other hand, the fact that
fighting took place only in certain parts of the country and not others
does not necessarily preclude the application of the IHL provided that
the criminal acts were sufficiently connected with the ongoing
conflict.
It is apparent that Uganda has been facing protracted armed
violence by an organized armed group under “responsible command,”
but one that never established any degree of territorial control. The
group has functioned as Kony’s alter-ego and he has administered
“discipline,” at least in the sense that he has executed persons who
dissented from his decisions.64 He did establish a political wing with
61. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj (Nov. 29, 2012) Case No. IT-04-84bis-T, Public Judgment
with Confidential Annex, para. 393 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia); Prosecutor
v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Tribun. for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 2, 1995).
62. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic (June 16, 2004) Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, para. 27 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia). The
Court considered the length or protracted nature of the conflict and seriousness and increase in
armed clashes, the spread of clashes over territory, the increase in the number of government
forces sent to the territory, and the weapons used by both parties. See also Prosecutor v. Limaj
(Nov. 30, 1995) Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, para. 90 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia) (adding whether the conflict has come the attention of the UN Security Council
and whether any resolutions have been passed on the matter).
63. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj (Apr. 3, 2008) Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, para. 49
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia). The Court considered factors such as whether
the group has a command structure with disciplinary rules; whether the group has a
headquarters; whether the group controls territory; the ability of the group to gain access to
weapons, other military equipment, recruits and military training; its ability to plan,
coordinate, and carry out military operations, including troop movements and logistics; its
ability to define a unified military strategy and use military tactics; and its ability to speak with
one voice to negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease-fire or peace accords.
64 . On October 2, 2007, Kony had his deputy Vincent Otti executed, likely for
disagreeing with him on certain issues. Otti ‘Executed by Uganda Rebels,’ BBC NEWS AFRICA
(Dec. 21, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7156284.stm. Moreover, the LRA has often
imposed harsh discipline on new abductees, both as a means of transforming the person into a
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an external spokesman, but this was likely a fiction created for
propaganda purposes in that he has never offered any form of positive
political program for the Acholi people. He established a command
structure for his military wing, complete with military ranks, uniforms
and unit structures. At least in the early years, the LRA received arms,
supplies and sanctuary from Sudan, but whether and when that
relationship ended is unclear. The LRA never controlled territory,
except when in base camps in the DRC during the 2006 to 2008
period during which time Kony conducted negotiations—likely not in
good faith—with the Ugandan government. Kony did, however,
operate with impunity over a large area of Uganda north of the
Victoria Nile, forcing the UPDF to conduct large scale operations to
track him down. It is this lack of territorial “control” in northern
Uganda that may preclude the application of AP II to this conflict.65
Nonetheless, the Uganda-LRA conflict has been of sufficient
duration (over twenty-five years) and intensity (a considerable
number of persons have been killed or displaced throughout the
country), that one could reasonably conclude that the conflict is a
“non-international armed conflict.” Typically, the LRA would raid a
village, killing or kidnapping scores of innocent civilians, while the
government was forced to respond with large scale military security
and search operations. One fact here that should be dispositive is that
the Ugandan government has felt obligated to respond to the armed
conflict with the use of its regular armed forces; clearly, the Ugandan
government believes that it has been facing much more than a law
enforcement problem and is engaged in a fight with a belligerent
group.
The explicit language in Common Article 3 clearly refers to a
conflict that occurs in the territory of one country and against its
armed forces; it appears to exclude conflicts involving a State and an
organized armed group in a neighboring State. Nonetheless, even
though Uganda is no longer faced with an adversary in its territory,
that fact should not change the characterization of the conflict.
new member and as a means of preventing escape. Opiyo Oloya describes the process as
Lwoko wii Cibilian (“Washing the Civilian Mind”). See OLOYA, supra note 11, at 82-90.
65. There is evidence that the LRA did control some parts of Eastern Equatoria (southern
Sudan) during the 1990s, but this could be best construed as the use of base camps for
operations against either the SPLM/A as a proxy for Sudan or against the Acholi in northern
Uganda. Schomerus, supra note 3, at 20-21.
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Uganda has continued its fight against the LRA, with permission from
the DRC and the CAR, and—while the LRA has committed
widespread atrocities against Congolese and Central African
peoples—the LRA has not taken up arms against those other
governments. The existence of state consent for UPDF operations
means that an international armed conflict does not exist between
Uganda and its neighbors; the lack of an LRA fight against either the
DRC or the CAR means that a non-international armed conflict does
not exist between the LRA and either the DRC or CAR. Instead, the
DRC and the CAR face a serious threat from an “organized armed
group,” originating in Uganda, which necessitates the use of military
forces supported by intelligence and air assets that neither country
has. Thus, the continued UPDF operations can be justified on a
defense of others rationale; indeed, Uganda has a moral obligation to
track down and destroy LRA elements committing continuing crimes
against innocent civilians in neighboring countries. On the balance,
Common Article 3 should apply to Uganda’s internal and external
conflicts with the LRA.
At least during the early years of the Uganda-LRA conflict, there
is some evidence that Sudan provided the LRA with arms, equipment,
and sanctuary, in part because Uganda was providing the same
support to the SPLM/A.66 However, it is difficult to assess the nature
and extent of the actual conflict between Sudan and Uganda during
that period. Nonetheless, each government used its neighbor’s
opposing non-state group to some extent as a proxy in the low-level
conflict that existed between them. In turn, this raises a question
whether Sudan used the LRA to conduct an “armed attack” against
Uganda, thereby creating a bilateral, international armed conflict
between Sudan and Uganda until the cessation of that reciprocal
support.
The 1986 decision of the ICJ in U.S. v. Nicaragua provides a
useful analysis under the UN Charter for the difference between an
illegal use of force and an “armed attack,”67 an important threshold in
66. See Schomerus, supra note 3, at 24-28.
67. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America) 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27, 1986). Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter proscribes
“the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state,” but Article 51 recognizes the inherent right of self-defense if an “armed attack” occurs.
Thus, if Uganda was not confronted with an “armed attack,” it did not have the right to
respond with armed force against Sudan. This means that an “international armed conflict”
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assessing the nature of the international armed conflict. In part, the
court examined the level of support provided by Nicaragua to the
proxy groups fighting in El Salvador, making a distinction between
groups that acted independently and those that acted under the
“effective” control of the state actor. The Nicaragua court found that
Nicaragua’s arming and training of guerrillas constituted a “use of
force” against El Salvador, but held that such actions did not arise to
the level of an “armed attack” which would have justified self-defense
actions under Article 51.
The court’s characterization of Nicaragua’s activity as a “frontier
incident,” that is hostile but localized military actions, suggests that
limited support to proxy groups might fall short of the “armed attack”
threshold. In fact, both the LRA in its fight against Uganda and the
SPLM/A in its fight against Sudan remained largely independent
actors, except for a possible period when the LRA operated from base
camps in southern Sudan, but without ever ceding control to its state
sponsors. 68 In other words, unless Sudan ever took “control” over
(helped organize, plan, or direct) LRA operations, the conflict in
northern Uganda likely remained non-international. 69 On one hand,
Sudan would never admit to taking control of the group and would
have every reason to hide evidence of its involvement with a
notorious organization. On the other hand, Kony has long claimed
political, military, and even moral status in representing Acholi
interests; he would never acknowledge anything other than an
independent political-military relationship with Sudan.

may not have actually existed between the two nations, despite the feuding proxy groups
supporting opposing sides.
68. See also Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the
ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 4, 649-88 (2007) (explaining the
differences between the “effective control” test in the Nicaragua decision and the broader
“overall control” test in the Tadic decision). Cassese believes that the more stringent effective
control test is appropriate where the issue is whether a state is responsible for the actions of
individuals in violation of IHL, while the overall control test is more appropriate where the
issue is state responsibility for organized armed groups or militia units. See id. at 657.
69. The International Law Commission provides: “The conduct of a person or group of
persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of
persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in
carrying out the conduct.” INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY (2001), art. 8, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/
9_6_2001.pdf.
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Arguably, Sudan may still be held accountable for breaches of
IHL as a matter of state responsibility, even if the fight remained a
non-international armed conflict. This, in turn, raises questions about
the identity of any Sudanese officials who supported the LRA, the
nature and extent of their support to the organization, and whether any
of their acts could be imputed to Sudan. Indeed, while the bilateral
conflict between the two nations ostensibly ended with the 1999
Nairobi Agreement, there have been periodic allegations (likely
unprovable) that some officials continued that support relationship for
an indeterminate period thereafter.
The Uganda-LRA conflict, at least through 2006 when the LRA
moved to new base camps in the DRC, is probably best characterized
as a non-international armed conflict within the meaning of Common
Article 3 but excluding AP II, despite the LRA’s capability to range
over broad territory.70 First, absent compelling evidence of control by
Sudan or other outside state actors, the conflict has involved an
“organized armed group” that waged an insurgency/terror campaign
against Uganda. Indeed, it is only during the 1998-2003 conflict
between Uganda and the DRC that the conflict could have included
an “international armed conflict” component.71 Second, the LRA has
70 . See generally Marco Sassoli, Transnational Armed Groups and International
Humanitarian Law, HARV. U. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POL’Y & CONFLICT RES. (2006)
(examining whether and how the existing rules of IHL should be adapted to address problems
raised by the extraterritorial character of the fight against transnational armed groups). One
consequence of this determination that the conflict is non-international is that neither Kony nor
members of the UPDF can be held criminally liable for “grave breaches” against civilians in
violation of Geneva Convention IV, supra note 6, Articles 146-47. See also CORN ET AL,
supra note 49, at 475-83 and 496-98 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision
on Defense Motion on Jurisdiction (Aug. 10, 1995), and Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Celebici:
Case No. IT-96-21-T (Nov. 16, 1998)). Both the Tadic and the Celebici cases suggest an
erosion of the distinctions between international and non-international armed conflict,
especially as it relates to serious war crimes. Nonetheless, the analytic distinction remains and
the “extradite or prosecute” obligation under Article 146 would probably not apply even
though serious violations of the Common Article 3 are still arguably war crimes subject to
universal jurisdiction.
71. The conflict did take on some early overtones of a transnational armed conflict with
offenses against the international community. For example, the LRA is probably responsible
for attacks on MONUC peacekeepers, to include a 2006 attack near Garamba National Park
that left eight dead. Armed Group Kills 8 UN Peacekeepers in Garamba Park, IRIN NEWS
(Jan.
23
2006,)
http://www.irinnews.org/report/57888/drc-armed-group-kills-8-unpeacekeepers-in-garamba-park. Such attacks, if made after July 2002, would be a war crime
under the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra note 14. Article 8 (2)(b)(iii) provides that it
is a war crime to attack peacekeepers “as long as they are entitled to the protection given to
civilian or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict.”
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never controlled territory, except in the sense that it directed activities
over a specific geographic area, making it difficult to argue for the
application of AP II to this conflict. Third, the LRA’s move to new
base camps is legally significant because the LRA ceased operations
in northern Uganda and entered peace negotiations with the GoU that
lasted through November of 2008. Peace and security returned to
northern Uganda for the first time in twenty years; this means that the
non-international conflict between the LRA and the GoU likely
ended, at least during that time.
The de facto peace between the LRA and GoU was short-lived,
raising a question about how to characterize the conflict after
December of 2008. By late 2008 the GoU had apparently concluded
that Kony was not negotiating in good faith and that the threat posed
by his group had to be eliminated through resumed combat
operations. The December 2008 UPDF attack on the LRA base camps
caused the group to initiate a new terror campaign, largely in a fight
for its existence as it sought food and supplies while trying to escape
pursuing Ugandan forces by fleeing west and away from Uganda. It is
this new terror campaign that has resulted in widespread attacks on
defenseless Congolese and Central African peoples, and has brought
further US and international support to the Ugandan fight. Arguably,
the post-2008 combat operations against the LRA are not a
resumption of the earlier non-international armed conflict, but
represent self-defense actions, or counter-terrorism operations, by
affected regional governments against an imminent threat from an
organized armed group.
C. The Combatant Status of LRA Members
The LRA poses vexing problems in terms of the combatant
status of its members under the Third Geneva Convention. Initially,
there is the question whether the organization itself transitioned from
a criminal enterprise, subject solely to Ugandan criminal laws, to
belligerent status under IHL, or has become some combination of
both criminal and belligerent. This poses important political and legal
issues for Uganda. In turn, this leads to the issue whether the LRA
members are combatants who can be targeted based on status and
later subjected to prosecution upon capture. Finally, the combatant
status of LRA members raises two additional complications, one
involving child soldiers and one involving kidnapped persons. Can
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children be targeted as combatants and then later prosecuted for
criminal offenses?
There is a significant question about the status of kidnapped
persons, primarily children, who were subsequently forced to become
either soldiers (the young boys) in the organization or wives (the
young girls) to LRA soldiers. 72 Treaty-based and customary
international law 73 generally proscribes the recruitment of children
under the age of fifteen into the armed forces, as well as their
participation in hostilities. Indeed, the LRA has not been known to
take voluntary recruits in over twenty years; the kidnapping of
children, some as young as eight, has been the preferred “recruiting
practice.” 74 In a typical attack on a village, the LRA members
rounded up families, young and old, and often forced children to kill
their own parents, likely as a psychological means of severing the
72. Arguably, many LRA members, to include even former senior officers such as ICC
defendant Dominic Ongwen who was abducted at age ten, and who grew to consider people
like Vincent Otti as father figures, are victims as much as they are combatants responsible for
war crimes. Ledio Cakaj, The Complex Story of a Child Soldier, WASH. POST, (Jan. 12, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/12/the-complex-story-of-achild-soldier/.
73. Under the 1977 Additional Protocol I, applicable to international armed conflict and
no doubt reflecting customary international law, children may not be recruited or take part in
hostilities. Article 77 (3) provides that if, “despite the provisions of paragraph 2, children who
have not attained the age of fifteen years take a direct part in hostilities and fall into the power
of an adverse Party, they shall continue to benefit from the special protection accorded by this
Article, whether or not they are prisoners of war.” The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Article 38, ratified by Uganda on August 17, 1990, extends legal rights and protections
to children accused of crimes. The 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, Article 4, provides that: “1. Armed
groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under any circumstances,
recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years. 2. States Parties shall take all
feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use, including the adoption of legal
measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such practices [emphasis added].” Uganda
acceded to the protocol on May 6, 2002. See also The African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child, which was ratified by Uganda on August 17, 1994 and entered into force
on November 29, 1999; Article 22 proscribes the recruiting of child soldiers and their direct
participation in hostilities. See generally Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary
International Humanitarian Law, supra note 25, Rules 136, 137. Rule 137 provides a useful
analysis of customary international law regarding the status of children while participating in
hostilities.
74 . See Christian Boatswain, Uganda: Child Soldiers at Centre of Mounting
Humanitarian Crisis, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, http://www.un.org/events/tenstories/06/story.asp?
storyID=100 (last visited Feb. 19, 2015). Amnesty International estimates that eighty percent
of the LRA combatants are kidnapped children. Kevin C. Dunn, Killing for Christ? The Lord’s
Resistance Army of Uganda, 103 CURRENT HISTORY 206 (2004).

272

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:2

connections with home and as a means of “bonding” new recruits to
the organization. Moreover, any children who subsequently attempted
escape were harshly disciplined. Nonetheless, at some point, many
such children have become willing members of the organization,
either as “soldiers” or in an active “combat support” role. In short, at
what point are kidnapped children no longer afforded status as
protected persons and become “combatants” who can be held
accountable for the capital, or other crimes?75
The International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) uses a
“combat function” test to assess whether someone can be targeted.
According to the ICRC, in “non-international armed conflict,
organized armed groups constitute the armed forces of a non-State
party to the conflict and consist only of individuals whose continuous
function it is to take a direct part in hostilities (‘continuous combat
function’).” 76 The ICRC sees the CCF test as involving a person’s
integration into combat operations, to include the “preparation,
execution, or command of acts or operations amounting to direct
participation in hostilities,” 77 but excluding other persons who
accompany or support the group. Here, a combat function could
include carrying arms, exercising command over the group (or a subunit), or carrying out various operational planning, intelligence, or
logistical (e.g., delivering ammunition) activities. Thus, the CCF test
makes it possible for the UPDF to target LRA “family” members, to
include either children or “wives,” depending upon the circumstances.
In other words, family members may support the group in many
different ways, including spontaneous, episodic participation in
hostilities, followed by a return to domestic activities. Nonetheless,
family members cannot be regarded as members of an organized
armed group unless they assume a “continuous combat function.”

75. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 6, art. 68 (4) provides that “the death penalty may
not be pronounced against a protected person who was under eighteen years of age at the time
of the offense.” AP II, supra note 7, art. 6 (4) also prohibits the imposition of the death penalty
on children under age eighteen at the time of the offense.
76 . Nels Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on The Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, International Committee of the Red Cross
16 (Feb. 2009). See also HJC 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of
Israel (1999) (Isr.) (construing the application of customary international law to Israeli
targeting practices against non-state actors, to include reviewing the standards for direct
participation in hostilities and imposing a “heavy” burden of proof on the attacking army).
77. Melzer, supra note 76, at 34.

2017]

THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: KONY & THE LRA

273

Kony and the military members of his organization probably
qualify as unprivileged “belligerents” within the meaning of the Third
Geneva Convention. 78 Article 4(a)(2) provides persuasive guidance
for assessing the combatant status for members of “militias and
members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized
resistance movements.” 79 Here, Kony has firmly asserted his
command over the LRA, 80 enforcing adherence to his own
idiosyncratic code of conduct, while his men have worn uniforms and
carried weapons openly, but while also consistently and openly
flouting the laws and customs of war.81 Indeed, Kony went to great
lengths for many years to showcase his organization as a “military
organization,” complete with ranks and unit structures.82 This means
that the UPDF can conduct status-based targeting of the LRA
consistent with the principle of distinction.83 Thus, a uniformed LRA
78. Geneva Convention III, supra note 5, art. 4(a)(2). While this standard is applicable to
international armed conflict, it does provide a useful reference for assessing the combatant
status for targeting the members of an “organized armed group” in non-international armed
conflict. The fact that the UPDF may make status-based targeting decisions does not
necessarily mean that the LRA members also have other combatant rights, such as immunity
from prosecution for killing members of the UPDF.
79. Id. The members of a militia, volunteer corps, or organized resistance movement
must be “commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates,” have “a fixed distinctive
sign recognizable at a distance,” carry arms openly, and conduct “their operations in
accordance with laws and customs of war.”
80. Evolution of LRA Command Structure, LRA CRISIS TRACKER (2016) (last visited
Feb. 18, 2015) (on file with author).
81. Kony has repeatedly demonstrated his capacity to enforce IHL, if he would choose to
do so. As an example, in 2007 Kony executed his deputy Vincent Otti, apparently as a
disciplinary measure. BBC NEWS AFRICA, supra note 64. Moreover, the LRA leaders have
been known to beat, torture, and kill recently abducted child to establish discipline and exact
compliance with orders. See OLOYA, supra note 11.
82. Under the 2005 UPDF Act, it is illegal for non-members of the armed forces to carry
arms or wear military uniforms in Uganda. Section 119 (1)(h)(i) gives the military courts
jurisdiction over civilians who have illegal possession of “arms, ammunition or equipment
being the monopoly of the Defence Forces. . . .” Section 164 (1)(a) prohibits any person,
without authority, from wearing or using “any uniform supplied, to or authorized for use by,
any member of the Defence Forces.” A violation of this latter provision can result in an
imprisonment term, not exceeding seven years. This is a point that is periodically raised in
Ugandan press articles. See, e.g., Pat Robert Larubi, UPDF Warns Again on Use of Military
Attire,” CHIMPREPORTS (Jan. 5, 2015), http://chimpreports.com/updf-warns-again-on-use-ofmilitary-attire. In short, there is unequivocal evidence that Kony claims combatant status for
members of his organization. This also means that Kony and his soldiers can be prosecuted by
general court martial for arms and uniform violations of the UPDF Act.
83. Geneva Convention Common Article 3 (1) provides that “[p]ersons taking no active
part in the hostilities” shall be treated humanely, but the phrasing in AP II is slightly different,
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member—with clear membership in the group—raises a presumption
of hostility and provides the UPDF with the authority to conduct
status-based targeting against such a person. The situation becomes
problematic if the LRA members are not wearing uniforms, or are
family members serving in a range of combat support roles. In any
case, as unprivileged belligerents, Kony and his followers may not
claim “prisoner of war” status and may be held accountable for all
offenses under Ugandan law, as well as for any war crimes committed
in violation of IHL.84
In sum, the Uganda-LRA conflict also raises important questions
about the status of LRA members, a point that concerns both targeting
as well as the scope of “combatant immunity” under IHL. The UPDF
must conduct operations consistent with the basic principles of
necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity. 85 Here, the
UPDF has a clear need to eliminate an armed group that poses a wideranging threat to civilians and military personnel, and it must do so
while limiting incidental injury to civilians (namely, persons not
taking part in hostilities) and avoiding or minimizing collateral
damage in accordance with the principle of proportionality. While, in
some cases, the UPDF can target LRA members based upon
combatant status in the organization, in other cases it is limited to the
standard involving direct participation in hostilities. Nonetheless,
captured LRA members are not entitled to claim prisoner of war
status with resulting combatant immunity.

directing that the civilian population “shall not be the object of attack” and that [c]ivilians shall
enjoy the protection of the afforded by this part, unless and for such time as they take a direct
part in hostilities.” AP II, supra note 7, art. 13 (3). According to the ICRC, “Acts amounting to
direct participation in hostilities must meet three cumulative requirements: (1) a threshold
regarding the harm likely to result from the act, (2) a relationship of direct causation between
the act and the expected harm, and (3) a belligerent nexus between the act and the hostilities
conducted between the parties to an armed conflict.” Melzer, supra note 76, at 46.
84. The right to prisoner of war status is controlled by Geneva Convention III, Article 4,
but that article is inapplicable to non-international armed conflict. Prisoners of war are
generally entitled to “combatant immunity,” that is immunity from prosecution for lawful
killings (e.g., UPDF soldiers and other government employees).
85. Melzer, supra note 76, at 77. The general principles regarding the protection of
civilians likely reflect customary international law. See generally Melzer, supra note 76;
Michael Matheson, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at Sixth Annual
American Red Cross-Washington College of the Law Workshop (Jan. 27, 1987).
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D. Assessment: The Scope of Combatant’s Privilege
The characterization of the conflict as non-international, as well
as a finding that the LRA members are “unprivileged belligerents,”
has important implications for accountability under both domestic and
international criminal law. On one hand, if a non-international armed
conflict has existed, Uganda can treat Kony and his followers as part
of a criminal organization subject to prosecution under Ugandan
criminal laws for the full range of acts, whether committed against the
UPDF or civilians. Moreover, even if Common Article 3 does apply
to this conflict, Uganda can still choose—as a policy matter—to
prosecute LRA members for the killing of soldiers and civilians alike,
or it can choose to exercise prosecutorial discretion and to exclusively
charge war crimes (effectively extending “combatant’s privilege” to
LRA members). On the other hand, if an international armed conflict
has existed, Uganda may decide to forego prosecution for certain acts
against the government while prosecuting Kony and his followers for
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Also, a finding that certain
offenses were committed in a non-international armed conflict limits
the permissible range of charges against LRA members (i.e., Kony
cannot be held accountable for “grave breaches” per se). In any case,
Uganda must make a policy decision on whether, as well as for what
crimes, to prosecute previously abducted children. This leads directly
to the question of how Kony and his followers could be prosecuted
under Ugandan law; this is a topic that has been seldom discussed in
scholarly literature.
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER UGANDAN LAW
A. Introduction: Modernizing Ugandan Law and Practice
In theory, LRA members can be prosecuted for a range of crimes
under existing national law, eliminating the need for an international
court to adjudicate cases—at least to the extent that municipal courts
are willing and able to do so. Uganda, since its 1962 independence
from Great Britain, has experienced political instability, with periods
of civil unrest and serious human rights violations.86 Nonetheless, the
86. Francis M. Ssekandi & Cos Gitta, Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Uganda
Constitution, 26 COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1919 (1994).
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1995 Constitution, the third since independence, provides for an
independent judiciary with significant powers. While the
administration of justice in Uganda has evolved in many positive
respects over the past 20 years, Ugandan law—constitutional,
statutory, and decisional—has shortcomings in certain areas and the
courts lack experience in complex criminal and war crimes cases.
This suggests that, despite great efforts to modernize Ugandan law
and practice, its courts would face important challenges in
adjudicating complex, high profile cases in a fair and consistent
manner that would be respected by disinterested and affected persons
alike. In short, the LRA offenses are not garden-variety criminal
cases, but involve a wide range of acts over a broad period of time
with complex legal and evidentiary issues that the Ugandan judiciary
has rarely, if ever, faced.
B. The Administration of Justice: Courts, Statutes, & Issues
Uganda was a British protectorate from 1892 until its
independence on October 9, 1962. Subsequently, the country passed
through several periods of military rule (the Idi Amin, Tito Okello,
and Museveni regimes) and marked human rights abuses. Eventually,
in 1987 Yoweri Museveni seized power and established a new
government. The 1995 Constitution provides for the overall structure
of the government and outlines a series of rights and freedoms.87 The
Constitution creates a legislature (the Parliament), an Executive (the
President), a Cabinet that includes the Attorney General 88 and the
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), 89 and the judiciary. On
national security matters, the Constitution creates the UPDF, 90 the
Uganda Police,91 and the intelligence services.92
87. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA (Uganda), (Sept. 22, 1995), arts.
20-45, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5ba0.html. The Constitution provides
for a range of human rights including freedom from discrimination, right to life, protection of
personal liberty, respect for human dignity, and protection from inhuman treatment, privacy,
right to a fair hearing, the protection of minorities, and the right to access information.
88 . Id. art. 119. The Attorney General serves as the principal legal adviser of the
government, including representation of the government in court.
89. Id. art. 120. The DPP directs police investigations and criminal prosecutions.
90 . Id. arts. 208-10. Under Article 210 (b), Parliament has the power over the
“recruitment, appointment, promotion, discipline and removal of members of the Uganda
Peoples’ Defence Forces and ensuring that members of the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces
are recruiting from every district of Uganda.” No doubt, this latter provision was enacted to
overcome the earlier British practice of recruiting soldiers largely from the northern districts to

2017]

THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: KONY & THE LRA

277

The Ugandan judiciary is based upon the legacy of British rule;
the English legal system, to include a hierarchy of courts that
adjudicate cases based upon statute, and English common law, to
include its customs and practices, has left an enduring imprint on the
Ugandan judiciary that continues to the present day. The 1995
Constitution provides for courts of judicature to include a Supreme
Court of Uganda, the Court of Appeal of Uganda, the High Court of
Uganda, and such subordinate courts as may be established by
Parliament. 93 In turn, Parliament has passed statutes that are
applicable to a wide range of national security issues and the judiciary
has decided a small body of relevant cases. Nonetheless, Uganda has
nascent structure, processes, and procedures, as well as judicial
experience, for addressing the complex issues in national security
cases.
Uganda has several important statutes that are applicable to the
range of offenses that occurred over the course of the entire conflict
with the LRA, to include acts committed by either military personnel
or civilians. The basic criminal law is the Penal Code Act of 1950.
Article 4(2) provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction over Ugandan
citizens who commit certain crimes abroad, to include treason, which
includes levying war against Uganda (Article 23); offenses against the
President (Article 24); concealment of treason (Article 25); terrorism
(Article 26); and promoting war (Article 27), with a five year statute
of limitations for offenses under Articles 23, 24, 25, and 26.94 The
Penal Code Act has articles on treason and terrorism that sweep
broadly and are subject to abuse. A person can commit treason in
different ways; some sub-sections require an overt act and other subsections can be violated by forming “an intention.” A person can
violate the terrorism article largely through political acts that support

ensure a “national” army. Parliament, in turn, has passed two statutes regulating the UPDF: the
UPDF Act 1992 and the UPDF Act 2005. Both UPDF Acts address military justice matters, to
include court martial authorities, structures, individual rights, and procedures. While the 2005
Act is more detailed and provides better coverage of the issues, there are still due process
concerns with the statute that include overbroad and vague articles, the lack of a right to
defense counsel in trial proceedings, the application of the statute to persons not belonging to
the UPDF or “accompanying the force,” and the application of the death penalty.
91. Id. arts. 211-14.
92. Id. art. 218.
93. Id. art. 129.
94. See The Penal Code Act, supra note 8.
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the organization, though this has been superseded by the AntiTerrorism Act of 2002.95
Kony and the senior leaders of the LRA could be charged with a
broad range of criminal offenses under Ugandan law to include
treason in that they have levied war against the nation, plotted and
acted to overturn the government, and aided and abetted others in
doing so in violation of the Penal Code Act.96 Additionally, Kony and
his senior leaders have clearly been members of a terrorist
organization, as defined under Ugandan law, and have committed a
range of firearms offenses under Article 26(4).
In 1964 Uganda passed The Geneva Conventions Act, which
essentially “domesticated” the 1949 Geneva Conventions treaties.97
The Act provides that any “person, whatever his or her nationality,
who commits or aids, abets or procures the commission by any other
person of any grave breach,” as defined in Geneva Conventions I
through IV, commits an offense and is liable to punishment for up to
life imprisonment. 98 It is also noteworthy that the Act provides for
extra-territorial (long arm) jurisdiction where “an offense under this
section is committed without Uganda, a person may be proceeded
against, indicted, tried and punished for that offense in any place in
Uganda as if the offense had been committed in that place . . . .”99
While Uganda is also a signatory to the Genocide Convention,100 this
treaty has not been domesticated into Ugandan law. 101 Contrary to
emerging international practice, Uganda does still impose the death
penalty for a range of offenses.102
95. The Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) (Uganda).
96. See The Penal Code Act, supra note 8, art. 23.
97. See generally The Geneva Conventions Act (1964) (Uganda).
98. Id. art. 2.
99. Id.
100. See The Genocide Convention, supra note 21.
101. Report of the Committee on Defense and Internal Affairs on the Petition on the
Lapsing of Part II of The Amnesty Act, 2000, The Republic of Uganda (Parliament), 27
(August 2013).
102. See The Penal Code Act, supra note 8. Uganda’s application of the death penalty
has been roundly criticized over the past ten to fifteen years, in part because it had been
automatically applied to a wide range of criminal offenses and in part because it is inconsistent
with emerging international norms. For example, in 2005, the Constitutional Court ruled that
its mandatory imposition was unconstitutional because it did not allow a trial to consider any
mitigating circumstances that might make the death penalty an unduly severe punishment and
did not allow a trial court any discretion in determining an appropriate sentence. Dr. Kizza
Besigye & Others v. Attorney General (2010) UGCC 6 (Const. Petition No. 07 of 2007).

2017]

THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: KONY & THE LRA

279

The UPDF, as indicated, is governed under a separate statutory
basis.103 While either the 1992 or the 2005 UPDF Act could be readily
applied to a wide range of war crimes committed by soldiers, there
are also limited provisions that be readily applied to Kony, his senior
officers and other members of the LRA. In any case, there are
important questions about the competence, independence, and
impartiality of Uganda’s military justice system.104 Both the 1992 and
the current 2005 UPDF Act fail to provide adequate structure and
processes for a fair trial, as applied to either military members or
civilians.
The 1992 UPDF Act proscribed a range of offenses and created
a military justice system that is independent of the Ugandan
judiciary. 105 Article 15 provides for jurisdiction over military
members and certain non-members who accompany the forces or are
commanded by members of the UPDF. It is noteworthy that certain
civilians are also subject to military law under Article 15(i): “every
person found in unlawful possession of arms, ammunition, equipment
and other prescribed classified stores ordinarily being the monopoly
of the army.”106 This article has been widely applied to militant/rebel
103. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87. See also Ronald
Naluwairo, Military Justice, Human Rights and the Law: An Appraisal of the Right to a Fair
Trial in Uganda’s Military Justice System (Nov. 2011) (unpublished doctor of philosophy
thesis, University of London). This thesis is an excellent study of Uganda’s military justice
system, tracing it from its historical roots to the present day, while providing a useful analysis
of important issues that impact the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
104. The government has, for example, claimed that it has court-martialed soldiers in the
documented rape cases brought by civilians over the course of the Uganda-LRA conflict. See
Wegner, supra note 21. But, even if one assumes that the UPDF may be able to conduct fair
trials for soldiers accused of war crimes and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law, this still leaves open the question of whether it would be “willing” to do so
in a fair and public trial.
105. UPDF Act (1992) (Uganda). One issue that has been periodically raised involves
the surprising argument that the Constitution does not even apply to the UPDF. According to
one jurist: “In the course of my eleven years service as a justice of the Constitutional Court, I
have heard very senior representatives of the Attorney General argue that the Constitution does
not apply to the Uganda Peoples Defence Force as it applies to other authorities and persons in
Uganda. They particularly like to argue that the Constitution does not apply to the military
courts martial because the Courts are not Courts of Judicature within the meaning of article
129 of the Constitution.” See also Uganda Law Society & Anor v. Attorney General (2009)
UGCC 1 (Constitutional Petitions No.2 & 8 of 2002). The Constitutional Court did hold that
courts martial were part of Uganda’s system of justice and were subordinate to Article 128
(Independence of the judiciary) of the Uganda Constitution.
106. UPDF Act (1992), art. 15(i). Naluwairo explains that this expansion of military
jurisdiction to civilians actually originated in 1973 by presidential decree from President Idi
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groups throughout the country and has been the subject of much
criticism.107 The 1992 UPDF Act further created a system of military
courts to include field court-martial,108 division court-martial,109 and
general court-martial. 110 Of note, the statute also created a CourtMartial Appeal Court, but it only has jurisdiction from the decisions
of a general court-martial; the statute did not provide for any other
appellate rights or procedures. 111 The statute makes no mention of
Amin, a dubious genesis for the modern UPDF Act. See also Naluwairo, supra note 103, at
119. See Ronald Naluwairo, The Trial of Civilians in Uganda’s Military Courts: Interrogating
the Reasons and Constitutionality, 19 E. AFRICAN J. OF PEACE & HUM. RTS. 383, 385 (2013)
(examining some of the arguments that have been proffered as justification for military
jurisdiction over civilians).
107. See Righting Military Injustice Addressing Uganda’s Unlawful Prosecutions of
Civilians in Military Courts, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 27, 2011), https://www.hrw.
org/report/2011/07/27/righting-military-injustice/addressing-ugandas-unlawful-prosecutionscivilians (explaining that military courts have prosecuted over 1,000 civilians during the period
2002-2011 for criminal offenses such as murder and armed robbery). See also John Emerson,
“Get the Gun”: Human Rights Violations by Uganda’s National Army in Law Enforcement
Operations in Karamoja Region, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 11, 2007),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/09/11/get-gun/human-rights-violations-ugandas-nationalarmy-law-enforcement-operations; Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 176-83 (providing a detailed
analysis under international human rights law that pointed out that allowing military courts to
exercise jurisdiction over civilians raises issues regarding differential treatment under two
different justice systems).
108. UPDF Act (1992), art. 78. This provision has been the subject of much criticism. In
2002, two Ugandan soldiers were tried by field court martial in Karamajo for a murder and
robbery that occurred only three days before, and, after a trial of less than three hours and
without an opportunity for any appeal, the soldiers were executed by firing squad. This has led
at least one commentator to question the due process protections (e.g., right to counsel, quality
of the pre-trial investigation, and appeal rights) available to UPDF soldiers. Indeed, there is
even a strong implication that senior officers had decided upon execution even before the trial
began. Henry Onoria, Soldiering and Constitutional Rights in Uganda: The Kotido Military
Executions, 9 E. AFRICAN J. OF PEACE & HUM. RTS. 87, 101 (2003). In addition, there are also
important questions about the jurisdiction of a field court martial, in that field commanders
may have unfettered discretion in whether to convene such a tribunal with the power to impose
capital punishment, but leaving a defendant with very limited rights. Naluwairo, supra note
103, at 163-65.
109. UPDF Act (1992), art. 80.
110. Id. art. 81.
111. Id. arts. 84-87. The Court Martial Court of Appeal was originally constituted in the
1964 Armed Forces Act, but later became non-functional during the Idi Amin regime and
thereafter. The Court was abolished with the 1986 NRA Codes of Code (Legal Notice No. 1),
but was reconstituted with the UPDF Act 1992. Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 116-22. The
UPDF Act 2005 provides that three of the five members of that Court, to include the
Chairperson, shall be qualified advocates while the other two must be senior officers in the
UPDF, but the statute makes no reference to their manner of appointment or tenure in office.
There is no provision for the reporting of its decisions or the appeals process from that Court.
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rules of procedure or evidence, the rights of an accused to retain
counsel, court-martial transcripts/reports, or issues of command
influence.112 Needless to say, the 1992 Act left open many questions
about the due process rights of service members, as well as of citizens
accused of weapons offenses.
The 2005 UPDF Act is a substantial improvement on its
predecessor, even though from a human rights perspective it contains
some important gaps, as well as vague language subject to abuse.113 In
addition, there are important issues concerning the competence,
independence and impartiality of the proceedings, raising concerns
whether the accused will receive a fair hearing and have appellate
rights. 114 In one improvement over the 1992 Act, the military is
enjoined to observe the rules of evidence and procedure applicable in
civilian courts. Article 41 provides that accused soldiers deployed
abroad will be repatriated to Uganda for trial or, if the soldier must be
tried outside Uganda, that Ugandan law will apply. 115 There are,
however, Articles that risk a confusion of military and civilian law
enforcement roles; this leads to questions whether the Ugandan Police
or the UPDF should be responding to a situation, the appropriate use
of force, and whether certain offenses should be prosecuted through
civilian or military courts. For example, Articles 42 through 45
This raises substantial questions about the independence, transparency, and impartiality of the
Court. Id. art. 199.
112. The Court Martial Appeal Court is managed by its own regulations. As Naluwairo
points out, this means that many aspects of courts processes and procedures can be changed at
any time by the Defence Minister without parliamentary involvement. Naluwairo, supra note
103, at 166-68.
113. UPDF Act (2005).
114 . See also Ronald Naluwairo, Uganda’s Military Courts and the Right to a
Competent Tribunal: Some Reflections, 5 MALAWI L. J. 161 (2011) (arguing that there are no
safeguards to ensure that Uganda’s military courts are competent and that appointed judicial
officers have integrity); Ronald Naluwairo, Military Courts and Human Rights: A Critical
Analysis of the Compliance of Uganda’s Military Justice with the Right to an Independent and
Impartial Tribunal, 12 AFRICAN HUM. RTS. L. J. 448 (2012) (arguing that Uganda’s military
courts lack independence and that appointed judge advocate officers lack tenure and financial
security); Ronald Naluwairo, Uganda’s Civil Courts and the Administration of Military
Justice: An Appraisal of their Jurisprudence on Selected Issues, 17 LAW, DEMOCRACY &
DEVELOPMENT 111 (2013) (providing an overview of Ugandan military law and analyzes key
cases involving senior army officers); see generally Ronald Naluwairo, The Trials and
Tribulations of Rtd. Col. Dr. Kizza Besigye and 22 Others (Makerere University, Human
Rights & Peace Centre, Working Paper, 2006) (examining the general court martial provisions
in the 2005 UPDF Act and the trial of Col. Besigye).
115. UPDF Act (2005), art. 4.
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address UPDF aid to civil power, for example in response to riots or
civil disturbances, and gives “officers and militants called out for
service . . . all the powers and duties of a police officer.”116 Article
119 (i), creating military jurisdiction over civilians charged with arms
violations, is essentially the same wording as in the 1995 UPDF
Act.117
Articles 120 through 184 proscribe a range of offenses. Many
offenses use vague/ambiguous language and/or carry harsh sentences,
particularly when one considers the lack of publicly available courtmartial records and reports that could be used to guide future lawyers
and researchers. In one example, under Article 122, a person “who
fails to protect war materials [e.g., arms and ammunition], misuses or
sells them, commits an offense and is on conviction, liable to suffer
death.”118 In a second example, under Article 123, a person who:
(a) is charged with the responsibility of briefing for an
operation and fails to do so;
(b) fails to obey instructions as explained or laid down
regarding a briefing for an operation; or
(c) fails to prepare for an operation,
commits an offense and is, on conviction, where there is failure
of operation or loss of life, liable to suffer death or, in any other
case, liable to life imprisonment.119

Clearly, both Articles 122 and 123 could result in heavy punishment
where the accused acted negligently or was not the proximate cause
of the operational failure.
Articles 191 through 249 describe the operation of the military
justice system to include the duties and functions of courts martial,
presence of military advocates at various levels, and appellate rights

116. Id. art. 43 (1). The UPDF routinely deploys units to Karamojong communities in
support of civil authorities, raising a question regarding the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions (a non-international armed conflict) or national law (domestic disturbances). This
creates a critical issue as it applies to arms offenses under Article 119(i) of the UPDF Act.
117. Id. art. 119(i). This article, like its predecessor in the 1995 Act, has been the subject
of continuing criticism. Umaru Kashaka, MP calls for reforms in military court martial, NEW
VISION (July 15, 2014), http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/ 657544-mps-calls-for-reforms-inmilitary-court-martial.html.
118. UPDF Act (2005), art. 122.
119. UPDF Act (2005), art. 123.
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and limitations.120 In general terms, this is a substantial improvement
on earlier law, although an accused person still lacks the right to a
dedicated defense “advocate.” 121 Naluwairo argues that Section
201(2), which prohibits a court member from “disassociating” himself
from a decision, effectively limits the use of dissents, thus impairing
the independence and impartiality of judges.122 Finally, the manner in
which courts martial are constituted, especially with regard to
appointment of serving military officers as judges, the limited use of
fixed terms (one year for general court martial members) and limited
requirements for legal expertise, 123 raises concerns about the
competence, independence, and impartiality of military judges.124 Not
only is there a risk of bias on the part of the judges hearing the case,
there is also a substantial risk of command influence and having
cases/sentencing decided even before trial.
Uganda has also enacted a 2002 Anti-Terrorism Act 125 and a
2012 Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act. 126 Both statutes
provide considerably enhanced governmental authorities to
investigate and prosecute a broad range of offenses. The 2002 AntiTerrorism Act proscribes a range of terrorist acts, labels four groups
120. The UPDF Act 2005 also recognizes two non-court martial authorities. Under
Article 195, a summary trial authority can hear and decide non-capital cases and, under Article
205, a unit disciplinary committee can impose a range of punishments. Both authorities
provide limited rights to defendants. Article 205 bars the presence of advocates, but allows the
accused the right to demand trial by court martial. Under Article 191 (3)(a), the summary trial
authority can impose a punishment of up to six months detention. Under Article 195(4), the
unit disciplinary committee can impose any punishment allowed by law (without definition).
In any case, these two “non-court martial authorities” lack many fair trial guarantees and are
subject to abuse. See Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 154-62.
121. It is noteworthy that the field court martial still retains the power to impose the
death sentence and the accused lacks any statutory appellate rights from that forum. UPDF Act
(2005), art. 227. See also Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 127-28.
122. Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 162-63.
123. There is, for example, no requirement for the judges at the division and general
court martial to be trained lawyers, only that a trained judge advocate advise each court during
proceedings and deliberations. UPDF Act (2005), arts. 194, 197, 198, 202.
124. Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 185-200.
125. The Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) (Uganda).
126. The Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act (2012) (Act No. 3) (Uganda). This
statute effectively domesticates Uganda’s international law obligation under The Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 10,
1984. Id. Uganda’s accession to the treaty was effective on November 3, 1986. See Convention
of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10, 1984),
1465 U.N.T.S. 85, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%
20IV/iv-9.en.pdf (last visited June 14, 2015).
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as terrorist organizations specifically including the LRA,127 provides
for enhanced investigatory authorities for the government, extraterritorial application (long-arm jurisdiction), and makes certain
offenses triable and bailable only by the High Court.128 This broad
statute clearly drives at many of the practices used by the LRA over
the past twenty-seven years to include murder, kidnapping, maiming,
and attacking.129
The 2012 Torture statute should be a particularly effective tool
against both eliminating abusive police/military practices and groups
such as the LRA. 130 The statute sweeps broadly, including persons
acting in an official capacity, as well as rebel/terror groups that
practice torture.131 On one hand, there have been frequent reports by
human rights groups of police and military personnel using torture
and coerced confessions, particularly within the context of treason
charges, over the past decades. 132 The effective and even-handed
implementation of this statute should go a long way to overcoming
127. The Lord’s Resistance Army, the Lord’s Resistance Movement, Allied Democratic
Forces, and al Qaeda. See The Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 125, Second Schedule.
128. Id. §§ 4, 6, 17.
129. Id. § 7 (defining terrorism to include murder, kidnapping, maiming, and attacking).
This statute became effective on June 7, 2002 and cannot be applied retroactively to earlier
acts committed by the LRA under the Uganda Constitution, Article 28 (prohibiting against
retroactive criminal legislation). This statute cannot, however, be used to prosecute civilians in
a military court martial. See Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 125 (citing Uganda Law Society v.
Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda (2006) UGCC 10 (Constitutional Petition No. 1).
130. The Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act (2012) §§ 2(1)(a), 3(2)(a)(b)(d).
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Uganda v. Okot & 12 Ors. (2012) UGHC 97 (discussing that the High
Court dismissed charges of treason and misprision of treason against thirteen persons who had
been accused of membership in a rebel organization known as the Popular Patriotic Front; the
court found that the prosecution had offered unreliable and inconsistent evidence, necessitating
acquittals based upon a failure to establish a prima facie case). This kind of result raises
questions about the quality of the underlying police investigation, as well as the DPP’s
decision to prosecute. It is also noteworthy that misprision of treason, that is a person
“knowing that any person intends to commit treason and does not give information thereof
with all reasonable dispatch” to the authorities, can be sentenced to life imprisonment. Id.
(citing the Uganda Penal Code, Article 25). See Hostile to Democracy: The Movement System
and Political Repression in Uganda, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 1999),
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/uganda/. See also Open Secret: Illegal Detention and
Torture by the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force in Uganda, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 2009),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/04/08/open-secret/illegal-detention-and-torture-joint-antiterrorism-task-force-uganda [hereinafter Open Secret, HUM. RTS. WATCH] (arguing that the
Anti-Terrorism Act is overbroad and could be used against opponents of the government even
when there has been no criminal activity).

2017]

THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: KONY & THE LRA

285

public concerns about heavy-handed police practices. On the other
hand, the statute could also be a very effective tool against groups
such as the LRA. In fact, many of the LRA practices could be
construed as torture against abducted persons (who are often
subjected to beatings, forced to maim/kill others, and raped) and
against the public at-large (e.g., causing the former “night commuter”
problem in the Acholi districts133).
The 2000 Amnesty Act was “predicated on a general desire to
bring an end to the acute and often vicious violence that had
characterized Uganda as a polity since the 1960s.” 134 The statute was
designed to encompass numerous different rebel groups that have
plagued Uganda since January 1986, to include the LRA, the Allied
Democratic Front (“ADF”), the West Nile Bank Front, and others.
While the Act was later amended in 2006 and Part II (the amnesty
provisions) was allowed to lapse briefly in 2012, the Act was in full
force through May 2015.135 This raises the issue of whether Kony and
other senior LRA officers could claim the protections of this Act
under the principle of lex mitior (i.e., the milder law) as a defense
against prosecution for certain offenses that he may have committed
while the Act was in force.
There are mixed views in Uganda regarding the propriety of the
Amnesty Act, especially in terms of whether it furthers the national
interests in bringing about peace, justice and national
reconciliation.136 This situation is complicated by the fact there is no
clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants with regard
to LRA membership. LRA members range on a “gray” scale from the
133. The “night commuter” problem involving children who, fearing abduction by the
LRA, would leave their villages every day to seek refuge for the night in the nearest town.
Keith Morrison & Tim Sandler, Children of war in Uganda, DATELINE NBC (Sept. 26, 2006),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9006024/ns/dateline_nbc/t/children-war-uganda/.
134. Republic of Uganda, Report of the Committee, supra note 101, at 4.
135. Kasandre Sarah Kihika & Meritxell Regue, Pursuing Accountability for Serious
Crimes in Uganda’s Courts: Reflections on the Thomas Kwoyelo Case, ICTJ BRIEFING 7 (Jan.
22, 2015) (explaining the parliamentary irregularities in the lapse/reinstatement of the law).
136. Republic of Uganda, Report of the Committee, supra note 101, at 12-18. See also
Abdul Tejan-Cole, Painful Peace—Amnesty under the Lome Peace Agreement, 3 LAW,
DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT 239, 242-43, 252 (1999) (noting the criticisms raised by the
international community against the blanket amnesty that was offered to senior rebel leaders in
the 1999 Lome Peace Agreement that would have ended the civil war in Sierra Leone and
arguing that true peace and reconciliation cannot be achieved without addressing the rights and
interests of the victims).
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recently abducted children who have been forced to participate in
acts, to adult members who—over a long period of time—have
become intimidated and even willing participants. 137 Culpability is
relative. On one hand, many people in northern Uganda support the
Amnesty Act because they want to see an end to the drawn-out
conflict; many of these people want the missing children to come
home, even if it means there is some level of impunity.138 In fact, the
Act encourages combatants to return home and reintegrate into
society, although there is evidence that the resettlement and
reintegration programs could/should be better funded.139 On the other
hand, there are many people who believe that Kony and his followers
have left such a wake of death and destruction that he and his
followers should be held accountable; the critics believe that the Act
promotes impunity and undermines human rights.140
One interesting case involves LRA Major General Caesar
Acellam, who had been initially abducted by the LRA in 1988 and
eventually captured by the UPDF in May 2012 in the Central African
Republic, and granted amnesty earlier this year. 141 This case
137 . Hope Among, Challenges in Prosecuting Former Child Soldiers in Uganda’s
International Crimes Division, 18 E. AFRICAN J. OF PEACE & HUM. RTS. 336 (2012). This
article reviews many of the important considerations that are involved in making a decision
regarding the propriety of pursuing a criminal prosecution or a grant of amnesty. The author
notes that many former combatants do not even know their own age, much less have a birth
certificate, making it difficult to determine a person’s age at the time a crime was committed;
that the brainwashing that occurred had impacted the person’s ability to understand the nature
and extent (unlawfulness) of their actions; that the children had, in most cases, been abducted
and had been forced to participate in crimes in order to survive; and that some children had
been supplied with alcohol or drugs to fortify their resolve.
138. Prudence Acirokop, A with Truth Commission for Uganda? Opportunities and
Challenges, 12 AFRICAN HUM. RTS. L. J. 417, 431 (2012). Acirokop notes that “[a]mnesty was
always perceived as a vital tool in conflict resolution and in longer-term reconciliation and
peace within the specific context of Northern Uganda as it resonates specific cultural
understanding of justice.” Id.
139. Republic of Uganda, Report of the Committee, supra note 101, at 39.
140. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Position on Uganda’s
Amnesty Act, Submission to the Hon. Minister of Internal Affairs, 4-10 (May 2012). This
document argues that blanket amnesty is inconsistent with Uganda’s obligation to prosecute
international crimes, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and gross violations of
human rights. This document also argues that the “Amnesty Act similarly contradicts
Uganda’s obligations arising from the Rome Statute.”
141. Samuel Okiror, Forgive and forget? Amnesty dilemma haunts Uganda, IRIN NEWS
(June 12, 2015), http://www.irinnews.org/fr/report/101625/forgive-and-forget-amnestydilemma-ha unts-uganda (describing the tensions in providing amnesty to Acellam). See
generally Mark Kersten, A Rebel’s Escape—An LRA Commander Tells His Story, JUSTICE IN
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illustrates the tension between encouraging amnesty, one of the few
benefits that can be had by rebels in a non-international armed
conflict, as a means of ending a conflict and the need for
accountability. Many people might ask how Uganda can grant
amnesty to such a senior officer, at one point the fourth most senior
officer in the LRA, one who planned and participated in so many war
crimes over a twenty-four-year period. Many people might also ask
how far Uganda should go in the interests of reconciliation. This no
doubt leaves the DPP with a difficult decision on whether to grant
amnesty: how old was this person when abducted? What were the
circumstances of his/her captivity? What acts did the person willingly
commit? Unfortunately, the credible, admissible evidence may be
lacking in many cases and the interests of justice may require the
grant of amnesty.
In terms of international law, Uganda is party to two treaties that
recognize and encourage amnesties even if neither instrument is
directly applicable to the Uganda/LRA conflict. Under Article 6(5) to
the 1977 Additional Protocol II,
. . . at the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall
endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who
have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their
liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are
interned or detained.142

Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, States
may grant amnesty for all cases where capital punishment may be
imposed.143 In addition, the Ugandan Parliament has also recognized
that a ban on amnesties is not part of customary international law,
noting the inconsistent state practice and conflicting legal opinions.144
Uganda has enacted a 2010 ICC statute145 that domesticates the
Rome Statute. The ICC Act addresses issues regarding persons
CONFLICT (July 31, 2013), https://justiceinconflict.org/2013/07/31/a-rebels-escape-an-lracommander-tells-his-story/.
142. AP II, supra note 7, art. 6, § 5,.
143. ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 6, § 4.
144. Republic of Uganda, Report of the Committee, supra note 101, at 28-29.
145 . The International Criminal Court Act (2010) (Uganda). See generally Sarah
Nouwen, The ICC’s Intervention in Uganda: Which Rule of Law Does It Promote?,
(University of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 22/2012, Aug. 2012) [hereinafter
The ICC’s Intervention in Uganda] (providing a useful history of the domestication of the
Rome Statute into Ugandan law, to include the pressures on the Executive and Parliament).
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accused of international crimes and cooperation with the ICC itself. In
part, sections of this Act apply to any requests by the ICC, any
enforcement of the ICC, or any investigation or sitting of the ICC,
regardless of whether the action relates to a matter that “was
committed before the coming into force of this Act.”146 This statute
provides the International Crimes Division (“ICD”) of the High Court
with the jurisdiction to hear cases arising from this statute. 147 In
addition, the ICC Act incorporates new of modes of liability, such as
the doctrine of command responsibility, under Ugandan law.148 This
statute, unlike the Ugandan Penal Code, excludes the application of
the death penalty.149 There have, however, been questions about the
adequacy of the ICC Act, to include witness and victim protection, as
well as when the DPP will apply the 2000 Amnesty Act.150
While the ICC may not recognize amnesties or traditional
reconciliation practices, it may not make a difference if the Amnesty
Act is applied to less culpable (less senior) LRA officers or their
family members. Nonetheless, the Act should be amended to define
the circumstances in which a person may qualify for amnesty. First, if
there are senior officers of the LRA who will be subject to
prosecution even if captured (as opposed to those who voluntarily
146. The International Criminal Court Act, 2010, Part I, art. 1.
147. The ICD, formerly known as the War Crimes Division, sits as a bench of three
judges and was established by the Uganda High Court in July 2008. The ICD has subject
matter jurisdiction over “any offence relating to genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, terrorism, human trafficking, piracy and any other international crime as may be
provided for under the Penal Code Act, Cap 120, The Geneva Conventions Act, Cap 363, The
International Criminal Court Act, No. 11 of 2010 or under any other penal enactment.” The
Republic of Uganda (The Judiciary), International Crimes Division, available at
http://www.judiciary.go.ug/data/smenu/18/International%20Crimes%20Division.html
(last
visited June 14, 2015). As of September 2011, the case of former LRA officer Thomas
Kwoyelo was the first one it had heard. McNamara, supra note 40, at 653. Apparently, the
ICD has had only a limited number of cases before it, to include the July 2010 terrorist
bombing of the Ethiopian Village Restaurant in Kampala. See generally Omar Awadh & 10
Ors v. Attorney General, UGCC 18 (2014).
148. See, e.g., The Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. (a)(i) (incorporating a known or
should be known standard for military commanders and other superiors); International
Criminal Court Act 2010, Article 19 (a)(i). In fact, the Rome Statute incorporates the
Yamashita standard. See also Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command
Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155, 209-11 (2000).
149. Compare The Rome Statute, supra note 14, Article 77(1) (imposing imprisonment
for “no more than 30 years” or life imprisonment “by extreme gravity of the crime and
individual circumstances”), with the ICC Act, 2010, Part II, Articles 7-9 (imposing terms of
imprisonment for “life or a lesser term”).
150. McNamara, supra note 40, at 659.
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renounced the fight by surrendering), those persons should be
identified by name. Clearly, there should be a distinction between
senior LRA officers culpable for planning and coercing others (i.e.,
have “command responsibility”) and less senior people who
participate for lack of choice in the matter. Second, the Act should be
clarified on whether a captured person will be allowed to qualify for
amnesty. This would act as incentive for persons to surrender; such
persons would have to choose whether to stay “in the bush” and risk
death/trial, or surrender and claim the benefits of amnesty. Third, the
government could clarify whether unnamed child soldiers (under a
certain age) would be granted amnesty for previously committed
crimes. Finally, the government should publicly announce a cut-off
date for surrender, after which the Act would be allowed to lapse.
This might prevent some persons from staying in the fight and
committing continuing crimes, but then later requesting amnesty at an
advantageous time.
There have been long-standing and substantial human rights
complaints levied against Ugandan law enforcement agencies. 151
Indeed, both the Ugandan Police and the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task
Force (“JATT”) have been criticized for a wide range of human rights
abuses to include unlawful killings, torture, and abuses against
suspects. 152 JATT is a joint, inter-agency organization that was
formed in 1999 using personnel from the UPDF, the Uganda Police,
and the intelligence organizations to combat the ADF.153 JATT lacks
a statutory mandate and has been under the operational control of the
Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (“CMI”). 154 Typically, JATT
personnel operate in civilian clothes and drive unmarked cars and
151. Brooke J. Oppenheimer, From Arrest to Release: The Inside Story of Uganda’s
Penal System, 16 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 117, 120-41 (2005) (describing the corruption,
incompetence, and inefficiency in the Uganda Police, the court system, and the prison service).
See also State of Pain: Torture in Uganda, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 2004), https://www.hrw.
org/sites/default/files/reports/uganda0304.pdf.
152. See Open Secret, HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 132, at 61, 92 (referring to both
the police and JATT). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, UGANDA 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT (2013), http://photos.state.gov/libraries/adana/766947/public/uganda_2013_human_
rights_report.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2017) (referring to the police).
153. See Open Secret, HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 132. The JATT’s mission has since
expanded to include treason cases and other terrorist threats to Uganda. Id. at 20-22, 25-26.
154. According to Human Rights Watch, the government originally intended that the
JATT would be under the command of the Inspector General of Police, but —when it appeared
that the police could not manage the organization—it was transferred to the CMI. Id. at 20.
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each officer uses the statutory authorities he has from his home
organization/command.155
JATT has been accused of arbitrarily arresting suspected
terrorists; holding suspects in lengthy pre-trial detention, often
waiting months if ever to bring a suspect before a magistrate156; using
ungazetted detention facilities (i.e., safe houses)157; using torture and
other abusive interrogation practices; and even extrajudicial
killings.158 While the CMI, Brigadier James Mugira, has promised to
investigate all claims of human rights abuses made against JATT,159 it
is unclear whether or to what extent the previously identified
problems have been corrected. In fact, Human Rights Watch found no
evidence that police and military personnel had been held accountable
for any prior abuses. 160 In any case, there are substantial issues
regarding the impartiality and integrity of law enforcement
investigations, including confused and overlapping police and
military law enforcement authorities.
Some people believe that the Ugandan Police, followed by the
judiciary, is the most corrupt institution in the country. 161 Indeed,
abusive police practices, particularly if biased towards the
government, as well as excessive delays and costs in court
proceedings, are conducive to corruption since people are left with
few options but to buy their way out of a bad situation.162 While this
155. Id. In certain respects, this command arrangement is not unlike a joint federal/state
task force used in the United States to investigate a major criminal incident. Nonetheless, the
manner in which the JATT conducts its investigations and operations is quite different from
any American counterparts.
156. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87, art. 23(4)(b) requires
that an arrested person be brought to court within 48 hours from arrest. Still, while the same
article discusses persons “restricted or detained,” it imposes no similar requirement for judicial
review. See art. 23(5). This creates an opening for abuse.
157. The 1995 Uganda Constitution proscribes the holding of prisoners in “ungazetted”
places, namely unacknowledged locations that are not published in the official gazette.
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87, art. 23, § 2, art. 49, §2. While
police stations are typically gazetted “legal” facilities, other places such as military barracks,
“safe houses,” and offices are not. Open Secret, HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 132, at 13.
158. See generally Open Secret, HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 132.
159. Id. at 58-60.
160. Id. at 5.
161. See generally Sarah Namulondo, Uganda Police Named Most Corrupt Institution,
INDEPENDENT (KAMPALA) (Dec. 11, 2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/201212120304.html.
162. On its Corruption Perceptions Index for 2014, Transparency International ranks
Uganda as 142nd of the 175 countries in the world. Corruption Perceptions Index 2014,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L (2014), available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results;
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report, prepared jointly by the Inspectorate of Government and
Makerere University, indicates that the removal of corrupt officials
has been a priority for at least some senior officials and some progress
has been made, the level corruption in 2012 (Uganda Police, 48%;
judiciary, 24.8%) indicates that this is a deep-seated problem that
requires a long-term effort. 163 According to Transparency
International, “in spite of recent investigations and corruption trials,
an effective enforcement of the laws in place is still lacking.” 164
Uganda’s government should place renewed emphasis on this critical
shortcoming.
In conclusion, Uganda has a well-structured judiciary with a
range of statutory instruments suitable for addressing an array of
national security issues. Still, some instruments would be more
effective for prosecuting LRA members than others. The
administration of justice has, however, several important
shortcomings with regard to its 2000 Amnesty Act, abusive police
practices, and corruption.
C. Notable National Security Cases: Steps & Missteps
Uganda’s courts have had limited, albeit evolving experience
with contentious national security cases. This makes it difficult to
make generalized statements about a defendant’s ability to get a fair
trial in such cases. Nonetheless, several recent court cases indicate a
need for caution in deciding the best means of handling high visibility
cases such as the prosecution of Kony, his senior officers, and LRA
members. Indeed, the ICD, as a recently established court, has had a
limited caseload and has been challenged by a lack of resources.165
see Deborah Hardoon & Finn Heinrich, Daily Lives and Corruption: Public Opinion in East
Africa, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, App. C, 47-49 (May 10, 2012), available at http://www.
transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/daily_lives_and_corruption_east_africa (finding based
on a survey of 1,025 Ugandans that the police and judiciary were perceived as the two most
corrupt institutions; that eighty-seven percent of those surveyed has paid a bribe; and that the
police and judiciary were the top recipients of these bribes).
163. Uganda, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (2015), http://www.transparency.org/country/UGA
(last visited June 23, 2015). See Deborah Hardoon & Finn Heinrich, supra note 162.
164. Maira Martini, Uganda: Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L ANTI-CORRUPTION HELP DESK, U4 Helpdesk Expert Answer No. 379,
1 (April 8, 2013), http://www.transparency.org/files/content/ corruptionqas/379_Uganda_
Overview_of_corruption_and_anticorruption.pdf.
165. See Elise Keppler, Justice for Serious Crimes before National Courts: Uganda’s
International Crimes Division, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 2012) at 1, 16-20, https://www.
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The Kwoyelo case, 166 involving war crimes committed while the
defendant was in the LRA, is a case of first impression in Uganda.
Though the defendant was taken prisoner over ten years ago, the case
is still not ready for trial and the recent decision of the Ugandan
Supreme Court on constitutional issues failed to resolve several
important points such as the characterization of the conflict or
whether he could be charged with grave breaches. The trial against a
political rival and former friend of the president, Dr. Kizza Besigye,
revealed a contentious and even disrespectful relationship between the
courts and the security services with serious due process
implications.167The difficult procedural history of his case illustrates
the problems associated with permitting the trial of civilians before
military courts martial; the defendant has faced simultaneous
prosecutions in geographically separated proceedings for the same
underlying acts with confrontations between the Executive and the
courts, resulting in unreasonable delays. And, finally, the Awadh case
illustrates challenging legal issues and security difficulties faced by
Ugandan courts in high profile terrorism cases.168 In short, one could
properly ask whether or to what extent Uganda’s judiciary is able to
decide complex, contentious cases in a timely manner.
Thomas Kwoyelo is a former LRA colonel who was captured by
the UPDF in the DRC in 2005.169 He was subsequently brought back
to Uganda and in 2010, while at the Upper Prison, Luzira, he declared
before a prison official that he was renouncing rebellion and seeking
amnesty.170 The Amnesty Commission, believing Kwoyelo qualified
for amnesty, referred his petition to the DPP. Instead, the DPP
hrw.org/report/2012/01/15/justice-serious-crimes-national-courts/ugandas-internationalcrimes-division (reporting that defendants have lacked access to counsel, to include adequate
time to prepare; that the remuneration for “state brief” (government-paid defense counsel) has
been inadequate, making it difficult for a defendant to retain experienced counsel; that the
practice in the Uganda judiciary of rotating staff and the lack of legal assistants increases the
burden on judges; that Ugandan judges and counsel lack experience with complex criminal
cases; and that Uganda lacks a witness protection program); see also Kihika & Regue, supra
note 135 at 8 (recommending that Uganda provide the ICD with adequate resources to carry
out its mandate and provide the accused with adequate resources to obtain a fair trial).
166. Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5.
167.See generally Omar Awadh & 10 Others v. Attorney General, 2014 UGCC 18
(Consolidated Const. Petition Nos. 55 and 56 of 2011).
168. Id.
169. Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5.
170.Id.
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brought criminal charges against him under the 1964 Geneva
Conventions Act, to include its grave breaches section under Article 2
of the Act, and the Uganda Penal Code.171The case was committed to
trial before the ICD. Kwoyelo requested a “reference” to the
Constitutional Court,172 on the basis that he qualified for amnesty and
that the DPP had taken discriminatory action against him by indicting
him despite granting other similarly situated former LRA members
amnesty.173 The Constitutional Court held the Amnesty Act did not
violate the nation’s international treaty obligations or diminish the
prosecutorial powers of the DPP. The Constitutional Court did,
however, hold that Kwoyelo had been discriminated against in
violation of Article 21(1)(2) of the Uganda Constitution.174 On April
11, 2012, the Attorney General appealed the case to the Ugandan
Supreme Court, but the case could not be heard until March of 2014
because the court lacked a quorum.175
In a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Bart Magunda
Katureebe, the Ugandan Supreme Court carefully considered the
Amnesty Act and the prosecutorial discretion of the DPP in deciding
171.Id.
172. Uganda’s Constitution permits the Court of Appeal to sit as a constitutional court
and hear petitions from trial courts—other than field courts martial—to decide issues of
constitutional interpretation. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87, art.
137.
173. Kwoyelo offered two examples involving officers who had been senior to him:
Brigadier Kenneth Banya who was captured by the UPDF in 2004 and Brigadier Sam Kolo,
the LRA’s top negotiator, who had surrendered in 2005, but the Court said that there was no
evidence either had committed the same crimes as the defendant. Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015
UGSC 5.
174. Id. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87, art. 21 provides:
“(1) All persons are equal before and under the law in all spheres of political, economic, social
and cultural life and in every other respect and shall enjoy equal protection of the law. (2)
Wthout prejudice to clause (1) of this article, a person shall not be discriminated against on the
ground of sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, or social or economic
standing, political opinion or disability. (3) For the purposes of this article, "discriminate"
means to give different treatment to different persons attributable only or mainly to their
respective descriptions by sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, or
social or economic standing, political opinion or disability.
175. Kihika & Regue, supra note 135, at 1; see also Anthony Wesaka & Perez Rumanzi,
The Task Ahead for Chief Justice Katureebe, DAILY MONITOR (KAMPALA) (Mar. 6, 2015),
http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/task-ahead-Chief-Justice-Katureebe/6883342643262-ftmxrsz/index.html (noting the two-year delay in the appointment of a new Chief
Justice and the impact that delay had upon the Uganda judiciary). The Constitution requires a
full bench of all members when hearing appeals from decisions of the Court of Appeals.
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87, art. 131(2).
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the propriety of criminal charges against the defendant.176 The court
then focused on eligibility for amnesty under the Act which provides:
(1) An amnesty is declared in respect of any Ugandan who has at
any time since the 26th day of January, 1986, engaged in or is
engaging in war or armed rebellion against the government of the
Republic of Uganda by–
(a) actual participation in combat;
(b) collaborating with the perpetrators of the war or armed
rebellion;
(c) committing any other crime in the furtherance of the
war or armed rebellion; or
(d) assisting or aiding the conduct or prosecution of the war
or armed rebellion.177

The key issue for the court was the meaning of subsection (c),
“committing any other crime in the furtherance of the war or armed
rebellion.” The Court found that the Act did not provide blanket
amnesty and that the DPP had an obligation to determine whether a
person seeking amnesty qualified in terms of whether his prior crimes
had been committed in furtherance or in the cause of war.178 The court
then examined Uganda’s obligations under the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions; here, the court
found that the conflict “may be said to largely be not of an
international character,” 179 but that it took on an international
character when it spread to neighboring countries include Sudan and
the DRC. The court then made a useful distinction between acts “not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly,” and those acts “in furtherance of the war or rebellion.”180
Finally, the court turned to the claim of discrimination when
other rebels had been granted amnesty.181 Here, the court examined
the Juba Agreements between the government and the LRA.182 Even
176. See generally Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5.
177. Amnesty Act (2000), Part I § 2 (Uganda) 3 (emphasis added).
178. See also UN Position on Uganda’s Amnesty Act, supra note 140.
179. See Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5.
180. Id.
181.Id.
182 . See Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5. The government and the LRA/LRM
negotiated two agreements during the 2006-08 period. Initially, the parties negotiated the
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of
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though the agreements were never finalized, the court noted that the
“substantive provisions of this agreement [contemplated] that
individuals should take personal responsibility for grave breaches of
the law, only that such persons should be guaranteed fair hearing
before an impartial Court.”183 In other words, the court was saying
that LRA leaders knew that the government did not plan to grant
blanket amnesty and that some persons would be prosecuted for
serious offenses. Indeed, the ICD was created with this purpose in
mind. The court found that the prosecution of one person for crimes
committed, but not that of another for acts that may/may not have
been the same, did not constitute discrimination in violation of the
Constitution. Moreover, the court explained that the DPP did not have
to enumerate his reasons for not granting amnesty to this defendant.
While the court was undoubtedly correct to remand the case to
the ICD for trial, its analysis was flawed in several respects.184 First,
the Court did not examine the characterization of the conflict as either
non-international or international armed conflict in any detail. The
conflict began as a rebellion before morphing into a non-international
armed conflict, but the LRA, as an organized armed group, has long
since become a criminal (terror) organization that preys on innocent
civilians. Kony has arguably abandoned his fight against Uganda, first
with his 2006 move into the DRC and, after December of 2008, with
his further movement west, away from Uganda. Kony likely now
seeks only his own survival. And, if the group has received outside
support from Sudan or has crossed through at least three foreign
countries (Sudan, the DRC and the Central African Republic) that
Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army, Juba, Sudan, signed on June 29, 2007. [hereinafter
Juba Agreements]. This principal agreement was later followed by the Annexure to Agreement
on Accountability and Reconciliation, signed on February 19, 2008. This annexure called for a
commission to investigate the causes of the conflict, including the human rights violations
caused by either side; to ensure that serious crimes are addressed by a special division of the
Uganda High Court, as well as traditional and alternative justice mechanisms; to create a unit
to investigate and prosecute cases; and to promote reparations to victims. While Kony never
showed up for the final ceremony, the government elected to implement the agreement
unilaterally.
183. Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5.
184. This decision did, however, directly answer several of the points raised by the UN
Commissioner. See UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 140.
The Uganda Supreme Court held that the Act was not a blanket amnesty and that the DPP had
prosecutorial discretion in making the distinction between more culpable persons guilty of war
crimes, crimes against humanity and gross violations of human rights, and the less culpable
persons who could be granted amnesty. Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5.

296

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:2

does not necessarily mean that an international armed conflict exists.
Indeed, the conflict could probably be characterized as an
internationalized non-international armed conflict. Second, the court
discussed the 1977 Additional Protocol II, but there is no indication
that it applies to this conflict.
Next, there are serious questions about whether Kwoyelo can be
charged with grave breaches under Article 147 of the Geneva
Convention IV, as opposed to either violation of the Uganda Penal
Code or war crimes. This will turn on what the exact offenses with
which he is charged and when and where he is alleged to have
committed those acts. It is conceivable that Geneva Convention IV
may apply at some points in the conflict, particularly where it might
be construed as international in character, but not others. Here, the
court used terminology interchangeably, no doubt introducing a level
of confusion into the case, sometimes referring to grave breaches,
gross crimes, gross human rights violations, and serious personal
crimes. Indeed, at one point the court said that the Juba Agreement
“make [sic] it clear that individuals should take personal
responsibility for grave breaches of the law,” but that term of art
appears nowhere in the agreement.185 It will matter greatly to the trial
court, the DPP and the defendant what the particular terms mean and
how they are used in this case. Can Kwoyelo be held accountable for
“grave breaches” under either Ugandan statutory or international law?
The court has failed to provide the trial court any legal or fact finding
guidance on this critical issue.
The treason case against Dr. Kizza Besigye is a cautionary tale
about the role of politics in the administration of justice in Uganda.186
The case demonstrates that abusive and discriminatory treatment can
occur when military and civilian jurisdiction is exercised
simultaneously over the same acts. Dr. (Colonel) Besigye, who had
been President Museveni’s physician during the 1980 through 1986
bush war to overthrow the prior government, retired from the UPDF
185. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation Between the Government of the
Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, Uganda-LRA, June 29, 2007
(using alternative terms such as serious crimes, human rights violations, or serious criminal
charges.)
186. See generally Dr. Kizza Besigye & Others v. Attorney General, 2010 UGCC 6,
Const. Petition No. 07 (2007). According to Human Rights Watch, the Ugandan government
has a “tendency to use the charge of treason to silence political opponents and those critical of
the government.” Open Secret, HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 132, at 22.
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in 2001. 187 He proceeded to become the leader of the largest
opposition political party, the Forum for Democratic Change
(“FDC”).188 He accused the government of corruption and pushed for
the end of the “movement” system of “non-party” government.189
Reportedly, President Museveni responded with threats of
disciplinary proceedings and prosecution in military courts. 190 Dr.
Besigye was then arrested on allegations of membership in the
shadowy People’s Redemption Army (“PRA”) and in connection with
an alleged plot to overthrow the government between the years of
2001 and 2004. He, along with several others, was charged with
treason and misprision of treason. Subsequently, Dr. Besigye and his
co-conspirators applied for amnesty, but the record is not clear
whether the government acted on their petition. On November 16,
2005, while making bail applications at the High Court of Uganda in
Uganda, the defendants were seized by an armed JATT team and
taken to Luzira Maximum Security Prison near Kampala. 191 On
November 24 at Makindye Military Barracks (in Kampala), the
government then commenced a general court martial charging
terrorism, rape,192 and unlawful possession of a firearm. In December
of 2005, despite an injunction by the High Court ordering the stay of
court martial proceedings, the UPDF ignored the order and continued
its proceedings.193 On January 31, 2006, based upon a petition from
the Uganda Law Society, the Constitutional Court held that the trial in
187. Profile of Main Opposition Leader Kizza Besigye, IRIN NEWS (Feb. 15, 2006),
http://www.irinnews.org/report/58147/uganda-profile-of-main-opposition-leader-kiiza-besigye
(last visited June 17, 2015).
188. The FDC makes plain its opposition to President Museveni, his policies, and his
unprecedented time in office. In that respect, Dr. Besigye is undoubtedly a lightning rod for the
opposition, and the government’s actions against him have clearly served as a catalyst for
protests. FORUM FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE, http://www.fdcuganda.org/ (last visited June 17,
2015).
189. See Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 212.
190. Id.
191. Besigye & Others v. Attorney General, supra note 186. This incident is referred to
in the dramatized court decision as the “First Court Siege.” According to Human Rights
Watch, this siege and a later one conducted in March 2007, were actually conducted by the
“Black Mamba Hit Squad,” a shadowy intelligence organization. Open Secret, HUM. RTS.
WATCH, supra note 132, at 16.
192. The rape charge was based on a 1997 accusation. Profile of Main Opposition
Leader Kizza Besigye, IRIN NEWS, supra note 187. In fact, the court that ultimately dismissed
the charge did so by raising serious questions about the adequacy of the evidence, implying
that the evidence could have been fabricated. Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 213-14, n.17.
193. Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 215-16.
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the general court martial proceedings for the same acts violated the
Uganda Constitution. 194 Nonetheless, the state still held the
defendants at Luzira Prison.195
Eventually, the treason trial commenced in the High Court and,
at the same time, the government proceeded to amend the charges
from the first general court martial proceeding.196 On November 9,
2006, the government then commenced a second general court martial
proceeding, also at Makindye Military Barracks. Allegedly, that
charge sheet contained the same or similar defects to the ones from
the prior court martial proceeding that had rendered it
unconstitutional in the January decision by the Constitutional
Court. 197 Moreover, this court martial proceeding charged the
defendants with an offense not clarified in the court’s decision, which
was not defined in 2001. Several warrants were then served on the
Ugandan Prisons Service to deliver the defendants to the
Constitutional Court on various days in January of 2007, but the
defendants were never produced. Later, on March 1, the defendants
were taken to the High Court for bail processing, but heavily armed
security personnel again took control of the court. 198 “Scuffles”
apparently ensued, but the defendants were not told why they were
being re-arrested or where they would be taken. One advocate stated
under oath, “[t]he security personnel simply insisted that they had
194. Uganda Law Society v. Attorney General, 2006 UGCC 10 (Constitutional Petition
No. 18 of 2005). This Constitutional Court case raises several interesting points about the
concurrent jurisdiction of the High Court and the General Courts Martial. First, the Court
indicated that the “first court siege” had contravened the Constitution and had violated the
judiciary’s independence. Second, the Court concluded that the general courts martial and the
High Court were equivalent courts that could both assert jurisdiction over certain acts, but to
do so in the same case would violate the fair hearing rights in the Constitution. Third, the
Court clarified the appellate procedures, namely that cases should be appealed from the Court
Martial Court of Appeals to the Court of Appeal of Uganda and then to the Supreme Court.
The Court did, however, note a contrary case that held that decisions of the Court Martial
Court of Appeals should be appealed to the High Court (the appellate processes are not
delineated in either of the 1995 or 2005 UPDF Acts). Finally, the Court concluded that the
military courts could properly try civilians for firearms offenses, but that the military courts
lacked jurisdiction to try civilians under the 2002 Anti-Terrorism Act.
195. Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 217.
196. Besigye & Others v. Attorney General, supra note 186.
197. Id.
198 . Id. This incident is referred to in the record as the “Second Court Siege.”
Apparently, this siege also resulted in the unlawful confinement of the judges and court staff
for over six hours. The record also indicates that Besigye was taken that day to Bushenyi (in
western Uganda) where he was charged with murder.
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orders not to permit the Bailed petitioners to go out on bail as ordered
by the Court.”199 Later that same day, after the defendants had been
turned over to the security forces, they were reportedly beaten up.
In October of 2010 the Constitutional Court held against the
government on multiple points in a unanimous opinion, describing the
evidence as largely not challenged and the government’s actions as an
affront to the Constitution.200 At this point, the court’s decision then
proceeds with a two-page dramatic, even poetic, recitation from a
book by another judge called “The Rape of the Temple.”201 The court
found that the defendants had been subjected to “humiliating, cruel
and degrading treatment” that violated the Constitution, that they had
been deprived of a fair hearing, and that the unprecedented acts of the
State at the High Court of Uganda had interfered with the exercise of
judicial power in violation of the Constitution. The court then issued a
stay of all criminal proceedings in all courts and a direction to each to
release the defendants; the court also indicated that the court martial
proceedings, as well as the charges in the treason and murder trials,
were null and void.
This case illustrates some of the difficulties faced by the
defendants in contentious national security cases that are heard in
Uganda’s courts. Initially, it is difficult to know whether there was
actual merit to any of the criminal charges that were filed against Dr.
Besigye or any of his co-defendants. What is clear is that he was
charged in multiple courts on varying charges, at least some of which
could not be sustained under the 1995 Constitution. Second, it appears
that there was a significant, but probably unquantifiable, political
component to the case. Dr. Besigye had been a former colleague of
President Museveni, but has now accused his government of
corruption and sought to replace him in office. Third, the government
apparently committed numerous due process violations and which
eventually foreclosed the government’s opportunity to have whatever
evidence it did have heard before a neutral fact-finder. Finally, the
security forces demonstrated a heavy-handed approach that
demonstrates a lack of respect for the judiciary.

199. Statement by Titus Kiyemba Mutale, ¶ 25; Besigye & Others v. Attorney General,
supra note 186.
200. Besigye & Others v. Attorney General, supra note 186.
201. Id.
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A further example is the terrorism case against Omar Awadh and
ten co-defendants, based on the July 2010 bombing of the Ethiopian
Village Restaurant in Kampala that killed at least seventy-four people
who were watching the World Cup Finals.202 Initially, the Inspector
General of Police formed a large investigation team to include
members of the Ugandan Police and JATT. After the team found that
the attack had been coordinated across several countries, to include
Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and the United Kingdom, the government
sought assistance from several foreign governments and
organizations. The defendants were subsequently arrested outside
Uganda and, in September of 2010, were indicted before the
International Crimes Division on multiple counts of terrorism,
murder, and attempted murder. The defendants then filed a petition in
the Constitutional Court challenging, on constitutional grounds, their
arrest, detention and transfer to Uganda, their treatment while held in
custody by the Rapid Response Unit203 in Uganda, and the on-going
criminal proceedings against them in the High Court (“ICD”). In part,
the defendants alleged that they had been subjected to extraordinary
rendition from Kenya (that is, the Kenyan Police did not have an
arrest warrant or an extradition order), that they had been tortured in
Kenya, and that they had been held in ungazetted locations and
tortured in Uganda. In fact, the defendants cited the Besigye case as
precedent for the proposition that mistreatment during detention
warranted dismissal of the case.
In response, the Constitutional Court made numerous important
findings.204 First, the court did not accept the claims of illegal arrest,
giving credit to the statements made by Ugandan Police about the
transfer process that had taken place. Second, the court found that the
defendants had been held in Uganda in excess of forty-eight hours
before being brought before a magistrate, but that violation was
202 . Xan Rice, Uganda bomb blasts kill at least 74, GUARDIAN (July 12, 2010),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/12/uganda-kampala-bombs-explosions-attacks;
Omar Awadh & 10 Ors v. Attorney General, supra note 147.
203. The Rapid Response Unit is an ad hoc security organization that, along with similar
government organizations, has been accused of human rights abuses. Open Secret, HUM. RTS.
WATCH, supra note 132, at 15-17. See also Violence Instead of Vigilance Torture and Illegal
Detention by Uganda’s Rapid Response Unit, HUM. RTS WATCH (Mar. 23, 2011),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/03/23/violence-instead-vigilance/torture-and-illegaldetention-ugandas-rapid-response.
204. Omar Awadh & 10 Ors v. Attorney General, supra note 147.
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insufficient to grant a stay of proceedings and could be addressed by
the trial court through appropriate compensation. Third, the court
distinguished the Besigye case as involving serious—and largely
undisputed—breaches of human rights by Ugandan officials, but that
the present allegations were general due process violations that had
been controverted by the government. Here, the court indicated that
the trial court could consider those claims on remand and, if
appropriate, grant similar relief to the defendants. Fourth, it
determined that the trial court could assess circumstances in which
confessions were made and whether coercion had been involved.
Next, the court considered—but found moot—the defense challenge
to the ICD itself. Essentially, the Court concluded that the ICD had
jurisdiction to hear the case because the case was assigned to a
division of the High Court of Uganda. Finally, the court considered
the novel issue (for Ugandan courts) of extraordinary rendition from
Kenya. The court made lengthy and in-depth review of the leading
US, 205 South African, 206 Zimbabwean, 207 and British 208 cases before
finding that the government did not violate the Constitution in
receiving the suspects from foreign States.209

205. Id. (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886)); United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
504 U.S. 655 (1992)).
206 . Id. (citing State v. Ibrahim (1991) 2 SA 553 (holding that the court lacked
jurisdiction to try a defendant who had been abducted from his home in Swaziland by South
African Police)).
207. Id. (citing Beahan v. State (1992) LRC (Crim.)).
208. Id. (comparing Regina v. Horseferry Road Magistrate’s Court Ex Parte Bennett,
[1994] 1 AC 42 (Eng.) (allowing an appeal where the defendant had demonstrated a level of
collusion between the British Metropolitan and the South African Police in kidnapping an
individual and bringing back to the UK for trial) with Regina v. Nicholas Robert Neil Mullen,
[1999] EWCA (Crim.) 278 (Eng.) (the Court of Appeal overturned a conviction where the
British Secret Intelligence Service “took active steps to persuade the Zimbabwe Central
Intelligence Organization (CIO) that there existed grounds for deportation and provided
evidence including, crucially, evidence of previous convictions, as well as draft documents
recommending grounds for deportation,” all in an effort to evade domestic and international
law)).
209. Id. The court noted that any alleged illegalities occurred abroad, without any active
Ugandan involvement, and that the Ugandan authorities did not violate any foreign states’
sovereignty; all actions had occurred with the full cooperation of the governments of Kenya
and Tanzania. Thus, the court would not consider any allegations of improprieties that may
have occurred before the suspects were transferred to the Ugandan authorities.
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D. Traditional Acholi Reconciliation Practices: Necessary but Not
Sufficient
Uganda has, as part of the Juba Agreements, implemented
various traditional reconciliation tribunals in the Acholi-populated
areas of northern Uganda. 210 In practice, truth and reconciliation
commissions have had a “restorative value” in bringing the former
warring parties back together in a traditional forum—consistent with
local cultural practice—that involves some truth telling, an
acknowledgement of wrongdoing, and the payment of some
compensation.211 Typically, the accused receives some level of minor
punishment, if the local community believes that he was truthful, but
more serious punishment if he was not. Indeed, the promotion of
traditional cultural norms can help foster a legitimate settlement and
peace from the viewpoint of the former belligerents and their victims.
While Acholi reconciliation practices have helped, to some
extent, the victimized peoples recover from the effects of war and
return to a normal life, such practices raise several important
problems when applied to a murderer/rapist and his victims. Some
have argued that “[l]egal measures of impunity provided by various
laws and constitutions under the guise of amnesties, pardons, and
truth and reconciliation commissions are not recognized under the
Rome Statute.” 212 On the other hand, the Rome Statute does not
exclude traditional practices. Instead, the statute focuses on whether
the “case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
210. Juba Agreements, supra note 182. See also Acirokop, supra note 138 (examining
the challenges and opportunities for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in addressing the
Uganda-LRA conflict, including issues involving concurrent prosecutions, amnesty, and
reparations).
211. Barney Afako, Reconciliation and Justice: ‘Mato Oput’ and the Amnesty Act,
Accord Northern Uganda, Conciliation Resources, 64 Accord 11 64-67, (200), http://www.cr.org/downloads/Accord%2011_13Reconciliation%20and%20justice_2002_ENG.pdf.
The
mato oput (the “drinking of the bitter root”) is a traditional practice that has been used to
address situations in which someone has been killed, either accidentally or intentionally. In
addition, ICC Prosecutor Louis Moreno-Ocampo has accepted that traditional mechanisms can
work together with prosecutions, but has not been willing to accept such an alternative for the
five persons then under ICC indictment. See also Alexander K.A. Greenawalt,
Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal Court,
50 VA. J. INT’L. L. 108, 143 (2009) (citing a 2007 interview Moreno-Ocampo gave to THE
NEW VISION (Kampala)).
212. Betty Kaari Murungi, Implementing the International Criminal Court Statute in
Africa: Some Reflections, 7 E. AFRICAN J. OF PEACE & HUM. RTS 136, 140 (2001).

2017]

THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: KONY & THE LRA

303

jurisdiction over, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution.”213 This language does not
mandate a western-style criminal law proceeding; it is ambiguous
language that allows for wide latitude in state-level discretion in
whether to prosecute (what the evidence supports), the forum
selected, the processes, and in the post-trial punishments that are
meted out. Arguably, if Uganda were to apply amnesty or
reconciliation practices, with minor punishments or bare reparations,
to a senior LRA officer who had “command responsibility” and who
had directed the activities of others, the ICC could infer that Uganda
was “unwilling” to carry out a genuine investigation and/or
proceeding.
A tiered process could address this issue.214 The more senior and
more culpable LRA officers who were responsible for planning and
directing large-scale offenses should be held accountable in more
stringent proceedings, either involving the ICD or an international
tribunal, that carry heavier punishments. Truth and reconciliation
practices are probably better restricted to the more numerous and less
culpable LRA “soldiers” and family members who carried out the
orders of more senior officers, especially if their crimes were
committed as children shortly after abduction or while under
coercion.215 In that sense, a truth and reconciliation commission could
serve several important Acholi interests; it helps reunite missing
children with their families, helping both the family to understand
what happened and the former child soldier to reintegrate into his
community. It could dispense with more formal legal proceedings
213. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 17(1)(a).
214 . See Michael A. Newton, A Synthesis of Community Based Justice and
Complementarity 35 (VAND. U. L. SCH., Working Paper No. 12-22, 2015) (arguing the
International Criminal Court should “develop a framework for understanding communitybased mechanisms in light of the ‘interests of justice’ analysis under [Rome Statute] Article
53”). In other words, the Court cannot simply impose its own preferences and override local
alternative justice mechanisms.
215 . See also Abdul Tejan-Cole, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Conceptual
Concerns and Alternatives, 1 AFRICAN HUM. RTS L. J. 107, 117-18 (2001) (explaining the
moral dilemmas involved in prosecuting child combatants before the then proposed Special
Court for Sierra Leone and suggesting alternatives such as truth and reconciliation
commissions with rehabilitative efforts or trials that do not result in a custodial sentence). No
child was actually tried before the Special Court, as its statutory mandate was to try those
“most responsible” for the offenses suffered. That limited the Court’s jurisdiction to
executives, not executors.
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involving both time and expense for people who are less morally
culpable.
E. Assessment: Willing, But Unable without Support
Uganda has clearly evidenced a willingness to address the
culpability of LRA members through diverse legal instruments, to
include prosecution before its courts, amnesty within certain bounds,
and traditional reconciliation practices. Each instrument has potential
value, if one examines the culpability of the person concerned and the
adequacy of the relevant processes. Nonetheless, the Ugandan
judiciary may be unable to prosecute the complex criminal cases
involving war crimes and crimes against humanity against senior
LRA leaders without significant outside support. Uganda has
lingering problems with its judiciary, with the applicable criminal
statutes, and in its administration of justice.
Uganda has an effective civilian judicial structure, to include
new legal instruments and institutions (e.g., the ICD), with a judiciary
that is developing the requisite expertise to handle such cases. Still,
the judiciary has been plagued by problems with staffing, insufficient
resources, allegations of corruption, and periodic political
interference. Uganda lacks a witness protection program.216 On one
hand, it would be a challenge to hold high profile LRA trials in a
location where witnesses and the public could view the proceedings,
without excessive interference from the Ugandan security services.
On the other hand, it would also be a challenge to try cases against
government officials and UPDF members without outside
interference and threats against court personnel and witnesses. This
raises concerns about the supremacy of the law and accountability in
Uganda.
Uganda has at least three important statutes that could be applied
to many, if not most offenses committed by the senior LRA leaders.
The leaders could be charged under the Penal Code of 1950, the
Geneva Conventions Act of 1964, or the UPDF Acts (for arms and
uniform violations only). While Uganda has passed several further
statutes that would be effective against terrorists and terror groups, to
include the 2002 Anti-Terrorism Statute, the 2010 ICC Act, and the
216. Memorandum from Gadeir Abbas, The Public International Law Group (Nov. 23,
2008) (on file with author).
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2012 Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act, the application of
these statutes to many of the offenses committed by the LRA leaders
would raise problems involving the prohibition against retroactive
criminal laws under the Ugandan Constitution.217 Still, many persons
could be charged under the treason, terrorism, murder, and rape
articles of the 1950 Penal Code, especially since the “grave breaches”
sections of the 1964 Geneva Conventions Act probably do not apply
to this conflict.
Uganda has several issues with its administration of justice,
raising concerns that a defendant might not receive a fair trial. First,
Uganda should reconsider its use of the treason and misprision of
treason articles in its 1950 Penal Code. Both articles raise concerns, if
not on the statutory language itself, at least as applied to certain
defendants. The DPP should demand a timely and effective
investigation by the Ugandan Police before proceeding to indict or
prosecute a defendant. Treason charges should never be a cudgel to
use against political opponents. Second, Uganda should repeal those
sections of the UPDF Act that permit the court martial of civilians for
offenses such as the illegal possession of weapons and uniforms.
Civilians should not be subject to criminal trials in military courts,
much less be faced with simultaneous prosecutions in military and
civilian courts, at least absent truly unusual circumstances. In any
case, there are serious questions about whether an accused person can
receive a fair trial in a court martial and whether that court functions
independent of the chain of command. Third, Uganda should amend
the Amnesty Act to make clear whether the protections offered are a
discretionary grant, or if their receipt is automatic once certain
qualification criteria are met. This would help avoid situations like
that of LRA Major General Acellam where there was a three-year
delay in making this decision, with much political controversy in the
interim.
Finally, and probably most important, there should be a stricter
separation between the executive branch and the judiciary. This
should be a cooperative relationship, with strict compliance with the
rule of law. Moreover, the Ugandan Parliament should establish
217. There are, however, several views on whether the ICC Act could have retroactive
application to LRA members. Nouwen, supra note 145, at 15-17 (making a distinction
between ‘act’ and ‘offence,’ but noting that this issue should be addressed using constitutional
procedures, first in Parliament and then in the courts).
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greater oversight over the executive services and agencies conducting
law enforcement investigations; each service and agency should have
clear authorities and limitations. This should help reduce overlap and
improve effectiveness, and should help prevent human rights abuses.
Ugandan judges require dedicated, qualified staff, not subject to
periodic rotation between different departments. In any case, while
Uganda may be currently unable to try complex, contentious cases,
outside assistance could help Uganda develop this capability.
V. ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
A. Introduction: Addressing the Scope of the Conflict
Uganda has several alternative means of proceeding against
Kony, his senior officers, and other members of his group, and each
approach has its own advantages and liabilities. First, the direct
prosecution under the national penal code offers wide coverage, at the
cost of a large number of defendants and a significant burden on the
judicial system. LRA members could be prosecuted under the Uganda
Penal Code for a range of ordinary crimes, to include treason,
misprision of treason, murder, kidnapping, assault, theft, defilement
of a girl under age eighteen, and rape, as well as arms and uniform
offenses under the 1992 and 1995 UPDF Acts. The Ugandan courts of
judicature have considerable experience in prosecuting and
sentencing defendants, although not at the scale and breadth seen in
the Uganda-LRA conflict. Such prosecutions could reach the entire
range of offenses committed by Kony and his associates with no ex
post facto problems. Second, the use of the ICC reduces the number
of offenses, especially since the Rome Statute only reaches offenses
committed after July 2002, while reducing the load on the national
courts. Third, Uganda could consider a new alternative, one involving
a combined ICC-Uganda tribunal that could assist with the further
development of the Ugandan courts as a fair and impartial court with
the capacity to address complex cases. A combined tribunal could
limit the number of cases if the agreement limits jurisdiction, but if
not, the tribunal could simply augment the ability of the existing court
system to handle the increased number of cases. Each approach has
political and legal advantages, disadvantages, and costs.
The ICC has undoubtedly had a salutary effect on the
administration of justice in Uganda over the past ten years. There is
ample evidence that the outstanding indictments against Kony and his
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senior leaders have caused Museveni’s government to adopt a range
of new legal instruments (e.g., the 2010 ICC Act and the 2012
Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act) and to create new
institutions (e.g., the ICD) that could provide some level of
“complementarity” in Uganda law and allow the government to
sidestep the ICC itself. While such a result might persuade some
senior LRA leaders to surrender, it also raises questions about the
adequacy of Ugandan law and its commitment to accountability. In
any case, President Museveni—despite some misgivings—has
accepted the fact that the ICC will now be proceeding with the case
against Dominic Ongwen.218 This leads to the question whether the
ICC itself is the appropriate forum for addressing the range of
depredations committed over the course of this conflict. For a number
of reasons, it is not.
The ICC lacks the temporal and subject matter jurisdiction to
cover the scope of offenses committed by either the LRA or the
UPDF over the course of the entire conflict. First, the ICC lacks
temporal jurisdiction for any crimes committed before July 1, 2002.
This means that the court could not prosecute Kony, Odhiambo, or
Ongwen for the full range of offenses for the prior ten to fifteen-year
period when the LRA operated with impunity over much of northern
Uganda and southern Sudan, terrorizing, mutilating, killing,
abducting, and raping tens of thousands of innocent people. Second,
the court’s jurisdiction is narrowly focused on genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression, 219 and
Kony and his co-defendants have been charged with only crimes
against humanity and war crimes. 220 Yet, the defendants can be
prosecuted for a much broader range of acts under the Uganda Penal
218 . Compare Frederic Musisi, Museveni to ICC: We are on Same Side, DAILY
MONITOR (Kampala) (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Museveni-toICC--We-are-on-same-side/-/688334/2641672/-/85qqoy/-/index.html, with Museveni Turns
from ICC Admirer to Critic, OBSERVER (Kampala) (June 9, 2013), http://observer.ug/com
ponent/content/article?id=25783:museveni-turns-from-icc-admirer-to-critic. Kofi Annan, the
Secretary General from 1997-2006, recognized that many Africans feel targeted by the ICC,
but that the concern was misplaced. As he “tried to make clear at the 2010 review conference
in Kampala, which added a definition of aggression to the statute, the ICC is simply needed
more in Africa because of the weaknesses of its judicial systems. As these systems strengthen,
there will be less need for the ICC.” KOFI ANNAN, INTERVENTIONS: A LIFE IN WAR AND
PEACE 154 (2012).
219. See Rome Statute, supra note 14.
220. See Prosecutor v. Kony, supra note 31.
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Code to include treason, rape, kidnapping, terrorism, illegal
possession of weapons and equipment, and inciting violence that
would go unprosecuted if the ICC is the court-of-choice.221 Ugandan
courts can prosecute the full range of acts, whether committed in
Uganda or neighboring countries.222
To balance properly the strengths and weaknesses of both the
national courts and an ICC prosecution, the ICC should adopt a
bilateral approach, combining lessons learned from both the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”). The ICC should establish a bilateral
ICC-Uganda tribunal, perhaps in Arusha, Tanzania, but based upon
Ugandan criminal law and appellate processes. The ICC should
establish this tribunal through an international agreement (treaty) with
Uganda which provides the court with the subject matter, temporal,
and in personam jurisdiction for all criminal acts, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity from January 1, 1990 to the present and
continuing. This tribunal should have jurisdiction over offenses
committed by either the LRA or the UPDF/Ugandan Police,
committed in Uganda, southern Sudan, the DRC, or the CAR. Such
an approach can make effective use of the pre-trial work completed
by the ICC and its investigators over the past years, while promoting
the rule of law in Uganda and furthering the work of the ICC to
ensure accountability for persons culpable of serious crimes against
international law. In any event, the treaty should name the persons
who will be tried by this tribunal and explicitly recognize Uganda’s
right to grant amnesty or prosecute any other LRA defendants.223 In
221. See generally Penal Code Act, supra note 8.
222. Uganda has a limited ability to assert personal jurisdiction over crimes committed
in southern Sudan, the DRC, and the CAR. Compare the Penal Code Act, supra note 8, Article
4 (granting extra-territorial jurisdiction for only certain offenses) and Article 5 (granting extraterritorial jurisdiction for acts partly within and without Uganda), with The Geneva
Conventions Act 1964, supra note 97 (providing for more expansive extra-territorial
application for grave breaches).
223. The Constitution of Uganda recognizes the common law right to the writ of habeas
corpus; the writ provides amnestied persons with a means for challenging subsequent criminal
proceedings for those same acts. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87,
art. 23, § 9. Since there is a potential for a conflict between domestic and international law on
the validity of amnesty as a bar to subsequent prosecution for violations of international
humanitarian law, this issue should be explicitly addressed in any ICC-Ugandan agreement.
While the agreement should name the defendants who would be tried by this combined
tribunal, the agreement should also allow the parties to add after-discovered malefactors. The
2015 decision of the Constitutional Court in Kwoyelo case suggests that the application of the
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overall terms, this approach would legitimize the role and work of the
ICC to date, both in the international community and Uganda, and
would facilitate capacity-building in the Uganda judiciary. 224 This
approach would serve the object and purpose of the Rome Statute
itself; this court would help end the impunity for the perpetrators of
serious crimes and contribute to the prevention of such crimes
through effective national prosecutions.225
This recommended approach also requires a policy decision
from Uganda. In a certain sense, there is a political advantage in
proceeding with the prosecutions in the ICC. On one hand, Museveni
made the first state referral to the ICC and there could be international
political costs associated with trying to withdraw that action—
especially since there is no provision in the Rome Statute that
addresses the issue. For domestic political reasons, Museveni may
also prefer that the ICC carry the burden of prosecuting a sensitive
case that could well cause many people to question his own
government’s conduct over that same period of time. On the other
hand, Uganda made the referral over ten years ago and there have
since been many positive, material developments in Uganda’s
administration of justice. Museveni may prefer a combined tribunal
that increases the involvement of Africans in ICC prosecutions and
showcases his government’s ability to address the issues. Finally,
while Uganda may choose—consistent with the ICCPR—to apply the
death penalty to a range of ordinary criminal offenses under its own
law,226 it would undoubtedly have to agree to its non-application to
any cases withdrawn from the ICC.
B. The Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court
The ICC, with its founding Rome Statute, has offered a major
advance in international criminal law, permitting the international
community to move forward from the ad hoc tribunals that were
combatant’s privilege to this conflict would provide a useful means for addressing this
possible conflict of laws, while still allowing prosecution for serious violations of international
humanitarian law. See Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5 (Const. App. No. 01 of 2012).
224. See Uganda v. Kwoyelo, 2015 UGSC 5 (Const. App. No. 01 of 2012).
225. See Rome Statute, supra note 14, pmbl.
226. Compare ICCPR, supra note 8 (permitting the application of the death penalty),
with the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 8 (seeking to outlaw that penalty).
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formed to provide justice and accountability for the atrocities
committed in a particular conflict. 227 While the international
community has formed various tribunals since the end of World War
II, the tribunals have been subjected to a range of criticisms as “a
victor’s justice,”228 as lacking of body of consistent and acceptable
jurisprudence, or as requiring lengthy negotiations with political
compromises. In that sense, the ICC has offered an opportunity to
overcome “tribunal fatigue”229 with a permanent court that offers a
neutral forum that can adjudicate well-defined and serious offenses
through established practices and procedures. Indeed, the Preamble
recognizes that “grave crimes threaten the peace, security and wellbeing of the world,” and notes that the most serious crimes should not
go unpunished and that effective prosecution must be ensured.230 The
Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002. Clearly, the ICC has
important features that limit its ability to address the Uganda-LRA
conflict.
The ICC is a permanent institution with “international legal
personality.”231 It was established at the Hague and has the authority
to “sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it desirable.”232 Indeed, this
article likely provides the ICC with legal authority to enter into some
bilateral agreements, not otherwise inconsistent with the Statute, with
a state party regarding the investigation and prosecution of cases that

227. See RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE AND ADAM M. SMITH, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
INSTITUTIONS 129-33 (Thomas G. Weiss & Rorden Wilkinson eds., Routledge 2009).
228. Id. at 3. In one important respect, that involving the definition of certain crimes
against the international community, the ICC and its founding Rome Statute offers a major
advance in international criminal law. Indeed, one criticism going back the Nuremberg trials
was that, consistent with the ex post facto principle, individuals should not be held criminally
liable for certain acts that had not been previously proscribed. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE
ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 580-83 (1992).
229. DAVID SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 168 (2012).
230. Rome Statute, supra note 14, pmbl.
231. Id. art. 4(1), provides: “The Court shall have international legal personality. It shall
also have such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the
fulfilment of its purposes.” Indeed, the bilateral international agreement between the UN and
the Government of Sierra Leone provides a certain precedent for a treaty between an
international organization and a sovereign government. See generally Agreement between the
United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone and Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138.
232. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 3(3).
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would otherwise be within its jurisdiction.233 The Rome Statute gives
the Court jurisdiction “for the most serious crimes of international
concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to
national criminal jurisdiction.”234 The Statute recognizes this principle
of “complementarity,” the principle that a State’s domestic courts are
accorded primary jurisdiction for prosecuting individuals, unless the
ICC determines that the State is “unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the prosecution.”235 The Statute gives the court jurisdiction
over just four crimes: the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and the crime of aggression. 236 The Statute limits the
range of applicable punishments to a term of years, not to exceed a
maximum thirty, or life imprisonment; the Statute excludes the
application of the death penalty.237
This structured approach offers several important advantages for
criminal prosecutions. First, it concentrates international attention and
resources on the persons responsible for the most serious and
politically sensitive international offenses. This permits the court to
develop the body of law that will be most useful to the international
community. Second, it encourages States to investigate and prosecute
offenses wherever possible. This facilitates improved state capacity
by encouraging States to handle cases through its own systems and
processes, avoiding international involvement. In short, a State can
know that if investigates and prosecutes cases in a good faith manner
it can avoid excessive international attention. Third, the
complementarity principle does not dictate any standards for the
investigation, prosecution and sentencing of culpable persons; the
Statute gives States great flexibility in their administration of justice.
233. Id. arts. 4(1)-(2). On the other hand, if the proposed agreement were considered a
significant departure from the Court’s authorities under the Rome Statute, it might be obligated
to seek an amendment to the statute through an Assembly of States Parties or at a Review
Conference. See id. art. 121(3).
234. Id. art. 1.
235 . See id. art. 17(1)(a); William W. Burke-White and Scott Kaplan, Shaping the
Contours of Domestic Justice: The International Criminal Court and an Admissibility
Challenge in the Uganda Situation, U. PA. L. SCH. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER
SERIES, Res. Paper No. 08-13, at 38 (reviewing the legal basis for a possible Ugandan
challenge to admissibility to include issues involving state referrals). Indeed, one object and
purpose of the Rome Statute “is to create a court of complementary jurisdiction that
preferences national prosecutions where they are possible.”
236. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 5.
237. See id. art. 77(1).
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Here, Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lakwena, and
Dominic Ongwen were indicted by the ICC with crimes against
humanity and war crimes.238 In terms of crimes against humanity, the
LRA could undoubtedly be charged with acts of murder, enslavement,
torture, and rape “as part of a systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”239 In terms of war
crimes, the LRA can be charged with “grave breaches” of the 1949
Geneva Conventions—if certain parts of the conflict were determined
to be international in nature, 240 serious violations of the “laws and
customs applicable in international armed conflict,” 241 or other
specified offenses in armed conflicts “not of an international
character.”242 While Article 8(2)(c) tracks the language of Common
Article 3 from the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Article 8(2)(e) expands
the list of offenses to proscribe “directing attacks against the civilian
population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part
in hostilities”; attacks against activities and personnel using the
distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions; attacks against
activities and personnel involved in a “humanitarian assistance or
peacekeeping missions in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations” 243; intentionally directing attacks against certain protected
places 244 ; and “conscripting or enlisting children under the age of
fifteen years into the armed forces or groups or using them to
participate actively in hostilities.” There is little doubt that Kony has
committed a range of acts that could be construed as criminal offenses
under either the Ugandan Penal Code or the Rome Statute.

238. See generally Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-53, Warrant of
Arrest for Joseph Kony Issued on 8 July 2005 as Amended on 7 September 2005 (Sept. 27,
2005); Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-54, Warrant of Arrest for Vincent Otti
(July 8, 2005); Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-7, Warrant of Arrest for Raska
Lakwena Issued (July 8, 2005); Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05/56, Warrant of
Arrest for Okot Odhiambo (July 8, 2005); Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-57,
Warrant of Arrest for Dominic Ongwen (July 8, 2005).
239. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 7(1).
240. Id. art. 8(2)(a).
241. Id. art. 8(2)(b).
242. Id. art. 8(2)(c).
243. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(iii). See e.g., Armed Group Kills 8 UN Peacekeepers in Garamba
Park, supra note 71 (reporting an armed group killing eight UN peacekeepers during an
ambush in the Congo).
244. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(iv). See Poaching Onslaught in Garamba National Park, supra note
43.
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The court has already completed many important actions since
Uganda made its state referral in December of 2003. The court has
completed extensive field work, both investigating the offenses and in
educating the affected populations about its work.245 The court has
issued and then unsealed arrest warrants, ordered the submission of
additional information, 246 initiated proceedings under Article 19 (a
challenge to admissibility) 247 and the appointment of defense
counsel,248 decided issues involving the participation of victims in the
case,249 severed the proceedings against Ongwen, and set that matter
for trial.250
In March of 2008, the Pre-Trial Chamber initiated proceedings
under Article 19(1), appointing an attorney for the defense for
purposes of the proceedings and inviting the parties “to submit their
observations on the Admissibility to the Case.”251 At this point, the
defense raised questions about the propriety of the proceedings, as
well as its representation of the defendants, who were still at large and

245. See Rep. of the Int’l Criminal Court to the UN Gen. Assembly, Oct. 17, 2006, ICCASP/5/15 [hereinafter Rep. of the ICC].
246. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-131, Order to the Prosecutor for the
Submission of Additional Information on the Status of the Execution of the Warrants of Arrest
in the Situation in Uganda (Nov. 30, 2006).
247. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-377, Decision on the admissibility
of the case under Article 19(1) of the Statute (Mar. 10, 2009).
248 . Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-320, Decision Initiating
Proceedings Under Article 19, Requesting Observations and Appointing Counsel for the
Defense (Oct. 21, 2008).
249 . Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-324 OA2, Decision on the
Participation of Victims in the Appeal (Oct. 27, 2008) (addressing issues relating to the status
of victims and the right to participate in the proceedings).
250 . Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision Severing the Case
Against Dominic Ongwen (Feb. 6, 2015) (noting that severance was appropriate given that
“there is no real prospect that the other suspects will appear nor certainty that they will be
apprehended in the near future,” and that the present case—against a defendant who
voluntarily appeared in court —should not be delayed). See also Wolfgang Schomburg, The
Role of International Criminal Tribunals in Promoting Respect for Fair Trial Rights, 8 NW. J.
INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 13-15 (2009) (discussing issues relating to the right to be tried without
undue delay under the ICCPR and before international criminal tribunals).
251. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-408, Decision on the Admissibility
of the Case Under Article 19(1) of the Statute (Mar. 10, 2009). Under Article 19(1), the “Court
shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it. The Court may, on its
own motion, determine the admissibility of a case in accordance with article 17.” Rome
Statute, supra note 14, art. 19(1).
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unable to participate in the matter. 252 The Government of Uganda
regarded the case as admissible.253 The Office of Public Counsel for
the Victims (“OPCV”) argued that the proceedings were premature,
indicating that it would be difficult to assess Uganda’s “willingness”
to proceed against the defendants given the pending peace agreement
and the creation of the planned legal/judicial machinery. 254 In its
March of 2009 decision on the admissibility of the case, the Pre-Trial
Chamber II made several important findings, to include the fact that
the defendants, as well as other parties, would have the right to raise
admissibility challenges at later dates. 255 While the Chamber noted
the pending peace agreement, with the implementation provisions, it
held “that it would be premature and therefore inappropriate to assess
the features envisaged for the Special Division and its legal
framework.” 256 This initial decision on admissibility was then
appealed by the defense and the matter was decided by the Appeals
Chamber.257
The ICC has two important articles that bear on the admissibility
of a case. Initially, Article 17 creates complementarity rules for the
admissibility of a case before the court and Article 53 allows the
prosecutor to reconsider admissibility after initiating an investigation
and prosecution. Article 17 does not impose specific legal
requirements on Uganda; instead, it focuses on a State’s “willingness”
to try a particular case, suggesting that a State could make good faith
determinations on whether and to what extent a particular person

252. See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision on the Admissibility
of the Case Under Article 19(1) of the Statute (Mar. 10, 2009), at para. 6-7.
253. See id. para. 8.
254. Id. para. 9.
255. Id. para. 25-29 (citing the Rome Statute, supra note 14, Articles 18(7) and 19(2).
Indeed, Article 18(7) envisions that Uganda could, later, challenge the admissibility of the case
“on the grounds of additional significant facts or significant change in circumstances.” Rome
Statute, supra note 14, at Article 18(7).
256. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-408, Decision on the Admissibility
of the Case Under Article 19(1) of the Statute (Mar. 10, 2009), at para. 51.
257. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05 OA 3, Judgment on the Appeal of
the Defense against the “Decision on the admissibility of the case under Article 19(1) of the
Statute” (Sept. 16, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/ CR2009_06675.PDF. The
Court noted that the role of defense counsel is limited at this stage in the proceedings and
“must be understood differently from the mandate of defense counsel who has been appointed
to represent a person as an individual.” Id. para. 1.
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should be tried for certain offenses and not others.258 Article 53(4)
provides: “The Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision
whether to initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts
or information.”259 Thus, while it may be have been true that Uganda
could not have previously investigated the LRA cases because of
shortcomings in the Ugandan Police and with JATT or could not have
prosecuted the cases based on the lack of an adequate (specialized)
court, the ICC is now in a position to reconsider the original
admissibility decision and consider a new approach that might offer
better prospects for accountability under both international
humanitarian and Ugandan law. In short, the existence and activity of
the ICC to date is not an ipso facto bar to the creation of a combined
tribunal.
There are important findings that can be made with the ICC’s
current approach to the prosecution of senior LRA officers. First, as
noted earlier, the ICC’s limited temporal and subject matter
jurisdiction is insufficient to address the totality of acts committed by
the LRA. Second, the court has completed exemplary work in
investigating the cases and initiating the proceedings against the most
culpable LRA leaders. 260 It is unlikely that Uganda could have
achieved such commendable results over the same period of time.
Third, while it was undoubtedly once true that Uganda was
“unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution,” 261 that is no longer the situation and the ICC can
reconsider its decision on admissibility and pursue an alternative
approach that would better serve the ends of justice.

258. See Abbas, supra note 216, at 25. In fact, even though the Rome Statute does not
permit the imposition of the death penalty, Uganda would not necessarily have to repeal its
death penalty provision because the ICCPR recognizes that it should be limited to the “most
serious crimes.” Compare Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 77 (1) (limiting sentencing to a
term of years, not to exceed a maximum of 30, or “a term of life imprisonment when justified
by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted
person”), with the ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 6(2).
259. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 53(4).
260. See, e.g., Rep. of the ICC, supra note 245.
261. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 17(1).
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C. Alternative International Approaches in Constituting an ICC
Proceeding
The ICTR, constituted by the UN Security Council under its
Chapter VII enforcement authority (threats to peace), and the SCSL,
created by a bilateral international agreement between the United
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone (“GoSL”), offer two
different models for the creation of a hybrid international tribunal.
Each approach has its merits, depending upon the willingness of the
host nation to support the investigation and prosecution of a case, the
capacity of the host nation’s judicial institutions, available funding,
and the need to provide accountability under both international
humanitarian and domestic law. Each approach also has its
advantages as compared to prosecution by the ICC. On one hand, the
ICC, as it sits at the Hague, can contribute to the development of a
coherent body of international criminal law, and move the
international community away from earlier ad hoc tribunals. On the
other hand, the ICC—at least as applied to the Uganda-LRA
conflict—can leave an impunity gap with the defendants not held
accountable for some offenses. The existence of such a gap can bring
about a loss of legitimacy and cannot contribute to developing
national state capacity. All said, a mixed tribunal under ICC
leadership, as suggested by the Sierra Leone experience, offers the
ICC and Uganda a viable means of achieving justice through
enhanced accountability.
The 1994 genocide had a devastating impact on Rwanda. It has
been estimated that over 800,000 people, largely Tutsi in ethnicity,
were killed in a hundred-day spree of popular rampage, all in a
country that had a pre-genocide population of an estimated seven to
eight million. 262 This genocide was planned and executed by
government leaders, with participation at all levels of society, often
with neighbor killing, mutilating, raping, and/or robbing neighbor.263
This genocide also eviscerated the Rwandan justice system, leaving
262. Mark A. Drumbl, Law and Atrocity: Settling Accounts in Rwanda, 31 OHIO N. U. L.
REV. 41, 42-43 (2005) (reviewing the history of the genocide and explaining how postgenocide trials occurred at three different levels).
263. Hollie Nyseth Brehm et al., Genocide, Justice, and Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, 30(3)
J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 333, 334 (2014). See also PAUL J. MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN
AFRICA: RWANDA’S GENOCIDE, ITS COURTS AND THE UN CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 19-22
(2000).
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the new government led by Paul Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Army
(“RPA,” later renamed the Rwandan Defense Forces) with
overwhelming problems in searching for, incarcerating and
imprisoning an estimated one million perpetrators. 264 This situation
led the new Rwandan government to request international assistance
in the form of a tribunal to try the persons most culpable for the
genocide, and to initiate national trials for the next most culpable
group and the local Gacaca courts for the bulk of the participants.265
The ICTR was established by the UN Security Council under its
Chapter VII authority of the UN Charter based upon a request from
the Government of Rwanda.266 The UN Security Council created this
tribunal with subject matter jurisdiction for “serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda
and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in
the territory of neighboring states, between 1 January 1994 and 31
December 1994.”267 The Statute then proceeds to define three crimes
that would be before the court: genocide, crimes against humanity,
and violations of Common Article 3 and of Additional Protocol II.268
The Statute also provides for concurrent jurisdiction between the
ICTR and Rwandan national courts, with the ICTR having primacy
over national courts.269 While the Statute does not exclude Rwandan
judges, it provides that judges shall be elected by the General
Assembly from a list provided by the Security Council. 270 Clearly,
this court was created with limited subject matter, personal, and
temporal jurisdiction focused on the most culpable perpetrators while
allowing Rwanda to prosecute a larger class of defendants. The ICTR
264. See Brehm, supra note 263, at 334-35.
265. See Drumbl, supra note 262, at 44-48.
266. S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 1994).
267. Id. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER, STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, art. 1, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professional
Interest/Pages/StatuteInternationalCriminalTribunalForRwanda.aspx [hereinafter International
Tribunal Statute]. Some Rwandans have criticized the limited temporal jurisdiction, arguing
that the ICTR should have examined a broader span of time to include the period 1990-94. See
also Drumbl, supra note 262, at 46, n.22; Nigel Eltringham, A Legacy Deferred?: The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda at 20 Years, E-International Relations (Apr. 29,
2014), http://www.e-ir.info/2014/04/29/a-legacy-deferred-the-international-criminal-tribunalfor-rwanda-at-20-years/.
268. International Tribunal Statute, supra note 267, at arts. 2-4.
269. Id. art. 8.
270. Id. art.12(3).
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has achieved commendable results with annual reporting on its
progress 271 and has recently reported that it anticipates closing its
doors by the end of 2015.272
While there are merits to the approach taken by the UN Security
Council, especially in providing outside expertise and resources, this
approach has also caused some level of discord and alienation
between Rwanda and the ICTR.273 The UN approach has excluded
Rwandans from the bench and court staff, and its distance between
Rwanda and Arusha has made it difficult for many Rwandans to
attend or even follow the proceedings.274 The Rwandan government
has dissented from the ICTR’s inability to impose the death penalty
on the most culpable persons, while it has imposed capital
punishment in its national level trials, and has also opposed any
suggestion that the ICTR might prosecute members of the RPA for
any abuses that may have occurred in ousting the former regime.275
Unlike the ICTR, there is some evidence that the Gacaca courts,
“which primarily operate at the local level, may inherit greater
legitimacy among local audiences than national or international
courts.” 276 This is no doubt true because local people have an
opportunity to see and participate in proceedings that concern them,
their friends, and their neighbors. Victims and their families can learn
about what happened and see some level of justice exacted, whether it
is in the form of prison terms, community service, or reparations.277
Sierra Leone experienced a devastating civil war that lasted from
March 1991 to January 2002 which started when Charles Taylor sent
his forces into Sierra Leone from neighboring Liberia.278 This civil
war was waged by several organized armed groups that committed
serious breaches of international humanitarian law to include the use
of child soldiers, enslavement of women as sex slaves, terror tactics
271. Rep. of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. A/69/206-S/2014/546
(Aug.1, 2014).
272. Rep. of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Report on the Completion Strategy
of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/2015/340 (May 15, 2015).
273. See Drumbl, supra note 262, at 45-48.
274. Id. at 47.
275. Id. at 46.
276. Id. at 55.
277. Id. at 52-61.
278. Stephen J. Rapp, The Compact Mode in International Criminal Justice: The Special
Court for Sierra Leone, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 11, 13-15 (2008).
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that involved chopping off the hands and arms of civilians, rape,
murder, and the exploitation of blood diamonds (pillage). 279 The
victims were men and women, infants, children and adults, largely
civilians of all ages. In fact, the rebel groups often targeted civilians
rather than military or government personnel.280
Initially, in June of 2000, Sierra Leone President Alhaji Ahmad
Tejan Kabbah wrote UN Secretary General Kofi Annan requesting
international assistance in setting up a special court for his country.281
President Kabbah called for a strong court that could address human
rights violations that had occurred over a ten-year period, noting his
government’s experience in negotiating with the rebels over the failed
Lome peace process,282 and the fact that Sierra Leone had a decimated
legal infrastructure and lacked the resources to dispense credible
justice.283
Eventually, the SCSL was created by an agreement between the
United Nations and the GoSL. 284 While the UN Security Council
declined to create a court under its Chapter VII authority, it did direct
the Secretary General to “negotiate an agreement with the
Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent special
court.” 285 The UN Security Council recommended that the subject
matter jurisdiction of the special court should include “crimes against
humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean
279. Id. at 14-17.
280. Id. at 14.
281. Charles Chernor Jalloh, Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice? 32
MICH. J. INT’L L. 395, 398-99 (2011).
282. In July 1999, the Government of Sierra Leone and the rebels reached a peace
agreement that was quickly dishonored by the rebels. See Rapp, supra note 278, at 19. This
raises a question of whether the rebel leaders committed an act of perfidy under customary
international law. See also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary International
Humanitarian Law, supra note 25.
283. See Rapp, supra note 278, at 19.
284. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone and
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138; U.N. Doc.
S/2002/246 (2002). The Statute provides creates a mixed court consisting of judges appointed
by both the GoSL and the Secretary General, provides for a prosecutor appointed by the
Secretary General and a deputy appointed by the GoSL, provides for concurrent jurisdiction
over serious violations of international humanitarian and Sierra Leonean law, addresses cases
involving child combatants and amnesties, outlines the rights of the accused, and limits
penalties to a term of imprisonment.
285. S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
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law committed within the territory of Sierra Leone,” and that the
“special court should have personal jurisdiction over persons who
bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of the crimes.”286
It is also noteworthy that the SCSL) had temporal jurisdictions for
crimes committed after November 30, 1996, even though the civil war
had started in March 1991. While there were apparently important
political and legal considerations involving the court’s jurisdictional
reach, this choice created a substantial “impunity gap.”287 Ultimately,
the SCSL conducted three main trials in Sierra Leone with the fourth,
involving Charles Taylor, held at the Hague. 288 One interesting
problem faced by the tribunal involved the July 1999 Lome amnesty
agreement and the claim that it would be an abuse of discretion for
the SCSL to try persons for crimes covered under that agreement.289
Here, the SCSL addressed that problem by concluding that,
[The] prosecution of the accused by an independent autonomous
court, initiated by an independent prosecutor and not brought in
the name of Sierra Leone, is not tainted by whatever undertaking
any accused claiming the benefit of the amnesty may have
believed he had from the Government of Sierra Leone.290

There were some important differences between the Chapter
VII-based ICTR and the treaty-based SCSL.291 First, as a Chapter VII
court, the ICTR was able to benefit from funding collected by the
286. Id.
287. Abdul Tejan-Cole, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 107,
115-16 (2001).
288. See Jalloh, supra note 281, at 404-12. Jalloh explains that, even though the Charles
Taylor case had to be conducted at The Hague because of security concerns, locating the SCSL
in Freetown had numerous advantages. He argues that as “the first modern ad hoc tribunal to
be located in situ—the place where the atrocities occurred—it not only offered victims,
witnesses and the general populace better access to justice, but also created the potential for
them to contribute more visibly, more cheaply, and more efficiently to the proceedings before
the Court.” Id. at 454. See also Nathaniel H. Babb, Don’t Forget the Far East: A Modern
Lesson from the Chinese Prosecution of Japanese War Criminals after World War II, 222 MIL.
L. REV. 129, 141 (2014) (stating that “hybrid courts are arguably better suited to meet the
needs of countries emerging from conflict and are less likely to be removed from the
circumstances where the crimes occurred”).
289 . Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon (2004) Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E); Brima
Bazzy Kamara (2004) Case No. SCSL-2004-16-AR72 (E) Decision on Challenge to
Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty.
290. See id. para. 90.
291 . Stephen J. Rapp, The Compact Model in International Criminal Justice: The
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 11, 21-23 (2008).
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United Nations and through the use of its authorities to mandate state
(third party) cooperation on issues such as the arrest, detention, and
transfer of accused persons. 292 Second, as a treaty-based court, the
SCSL was able to avoid UN rules on procurement and personnel, but
while having to cope with problems associated with soliciting
financial support from outside donors.293 Unlike the earlier ICTR that
had been located in Arusha, Tanzania, about 500 miles from Kigali,
the SCSL was based in Freetown so that it could readily hear from
witnesses and make it possible for the Sierra Leonean people to
following the proceedings. Indeed, some sixty percent of the court’s
employees were citizens of Sierra Leone.294 In other words, a treatybased court offers an opportunity for much more local “ownership”
and public education about its efforts.
The Sierra Leone treaty-based, mixed tribunal would be a useful
precedent for the ICC to create a similar tribunal—with broad subject
matter, personal and temporal jurisdiction—for the entire scope and
duration of the Uganda-LRA conflict. 295 In fact, the UN Security
Council expressly provided for the broad subject matter jurisdiction:
. . . to help foster a sense of local ownership of the SCSL and its
processes; to allow greater flexibility to the Prosecutor to pick
and choose which of national and or international offenses to
charge suspects with; and finally, to cast a wider net to ensure
that the leaders responsible for the atrocities would not escape
punishment.296

Like Sierra Leone, Uganda has experienced a prolonged period of
civil war and instability in the north with widespread human rights
abuses by the rebel groups involving child combatants and novel
292. See id. at 26-28 (relating problems associated with the arrest of Charles Taylor). See
also Magnarella, Justice in Africa, supra note 263, at 43.
293. See Rapp, supra note 291, at 21-22.
294. Id. at 34.
295. The Rome Statute allows the Court to provide a range of assistance activities to
national governments such as training activities and the use of observer missions. See Rome
Statute, supra note 14, art. 93. While there is a risk that the Court could become too closely
involved with a host nation, making it more difficult for the Court to later criticize the
proceedings as non-genuine, there are also great opportunities for partnership and increased
dialogue that could increase host nation legal capacity. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE (2003),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/20BB4494-70F9-4698-8E30907F631453ED/281984/complementarity.pdf.
296. See Jalloh, supra note 281, at 403.
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gender crimes. In addition, some people believed that an international
court with strong participation from Sierra Leone would be a useful
means of excluding the use of the death penalty under national law.297
Unlike Sierra Leone, Uganda has a strong body of constitutional,
statutory, and decisional law, with a capable and functioning
judiciary—albeit one that has some important shortcomings. Indeed,
unlike the Sierra Leonean judiciary that had been heavily impacted by
the ravages of the civil war, Uganda has a capable judiciary with
some experience in international criminal law; Uganda could greatly
benefit from “capacity building” on the part of the ICC, at least in a
qualitative sense. 298 Here, the ICC could help ensure that the
defendants have fair trial rights, something that has been lacking in
some Ugandan criminal trials (e.g., the role of the Ugandan Police
and/or JATT in investigating cases and detaining and interrogating
suspects, the possible selective prosecution of Thomas Kwoyelo,299 or
the multiple military and civilian proceedings against Colonel Kizza
Besigye). In short, a mixed tribunal under ICC leadership could be an
effective forum that delivers robust justice with enhanced legitimacy
and strengthens local institutions.
D. A Recommended Way Forward: Closing an Impunity Gap
There are important political and legal advantages to the use of a
hybrid approach that combines the efforts of the ICC and Uganda’s
courts. First, and probably most important, prosecutions through a
hybrid court involving the ICC and the Ugandan courts would serve
the object and purpose of the Rome Statute itself. A hybrid court
would help end the impunity for the perpetrators of serious crimes
297. Id. at 401.
298 . CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87, Chapter VIII
(outlining the structures, functions, and authorities of an independent judiciary). Article 129
permits Parliament to establish subordinate courts with appellate rights to the High Court and
to the Court of Appeals. In other words, the ICD is a creature of Parliament—not the
Constitution itself—and Parliament could alter the “structures, procedures and functions” of
that court (a division of the High Court) under Article 150. A bilateral agreement between the
ICC and Uganda could, therefore, result in mixed tribunal that has both ICC and Ugandan trial
judges, or it could result in a pure Ugandan bench with official observers from the ICC.
299. Nouwen, supra note 145 (stating that “[t]o date the prosecution of Kwoyelo appears
to be a one-off case, prompted by opportunism rather than law,” and his prosecution served a
political move in anticipation of the 2010 ICC Review Conference that was conducted in
Kampala).
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and contribute to the prevention of such crimes through effective
national prosecutions.300 The ICC would be positioned to support and
mentor the Ugandan judges, both through its staff and judges in an
observer status, contributing to enhanced Ugandan legal capacity.
Second, the ICC likely has the authority under the Rome Statute,
Article 93, to affect such an international agreement without recourse
to the Assembly of States Parties and the time consuming statutory
amendment process under Article 7(1).301 Third, a hybrid court could
validate the quality of the investigative and pre-trial work that already
been completed by ICC. The court could make public and use its
investigative work, especially as it involves crimes committed by
members of the UPDF against either the civilian population or LRA
members, in criminal proceedings. This would help people—both in
northern Uganda and the international community—see that a fair and
balanced process is taking place, enhancing the credibility of the
tribunal.302 Fourth, the tribunal could contribute to the significant and
positive changes in Uganda’s administration of justice over the past
ten years. Here, the presence of ICC judges, investigators and staff
would add credibility to the Ugandan proceedings and help the
Ugandan judiciary work through some difficult and contentious
material. Finally, this approach would actually incentivize other
States that make early referrals to the ICC, knowing that if they too
had occasion to request withdraw a referral based upon a change of
circumstances that they might actually reap political and legal
benefits in making a stand against impunity.

300. Rome Statute, supra note 14, pmbl.
301. Id. art. 93 (allowing the Court to provide a range of assistance activities to State
parties).
302. Nouwen, supra note 145, at 23. Some have questioned the ICC’s failure to open an
investigation into the conduct of the UPDF. While some could argue that the LRA’s offenses
were graver than any committed by UPDF soldiers or that there is a lack of evidence, others
suggest that the explanation “can be found in its dependence on cooperation of the Ugandan
government for its case against the LRA—had the [Office of the Prosecutor] antagonised the
Ugandan government by investigating and prosecuting its members or subordinates, chances
would have been slim that Uganda would cooperate in the ICC’s case against the LRA in the
way it has.” Id. See also Anne Mugisa & Hillary Nsambu, ICC clears UPDF in the north,
NEW VISION (Kampala) (Aug. 30, 2008), http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/
1182172/icc-clears-updf-north (explaining that the ICC has not found sufficient evidence
against the UPDF to warrant indictments against any of its officers).
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There has been notable antagonism between many African
leaders over the past ten years and the ICC.303 Some African heads of
state believe that there has been an excessive emphasis on African
cases, while other leaders—particularly leaders in the political
opposition parties—believe that President Museveni and some of his
senior officers should be prosecuted for crimes that they themselves
have committed over the course of the same conflicts. President
Museveni, while speaking at the UN General Assembly in September
2013, spoke of “African anger” in that its positions on African issues
had been ignored.304 In short, an ICC initiative that uses a bilateral
approach, combining the work of the court and the Ugandan judiciary,
could help alleviate some of the accumulated antagonism between the
court and African leaders. A joint proceeding, especially one based in
East Africa, could provide increased transparency and legitimacy to
its proceedings. This is an initiative that the ICC should support; it
could help the court maintain its long-term relationships with many
African nations. Also, this is an initiative that Uganda should support,
as it could give Uganda increased voice in the court’s proceedings
while enhancing its own national capacity.
A bilateral ICC-Uganda agreement should address the following
issues:


It should require that all LRA criminal offenses be heard
by the ICD, supported by ICC staff and with ICC trial
judges in an observer status (i.e., a mentoring role)

303. See, e.g., Frederic Musisi & Nelson Wesonga, Is Museveni attack on ICC for PanAfricanism or personal reasons?, DAILY MONITOR (Kampala) (Dec. 17, 2014),
http://www.monitor.co.ug/artsculture/Reviews/Is-Museveni-attack-on-ICC-for-PanAfricanism-or-personal/-/691232/2559688/-/ju1ffu/-/index.html. Indeed, President Museveni
had earlier attacked the ICC at the 2013 inauguration of Kenya’s President Uhuru Muigai
Kenyatta. According to press, “Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni told the gathering of
dozens of African leaders and tens of thousands of Kenyans on Tuesday that he saluted
Kenyan voters for rejecting “the blackmail” of the ICC by electing as president Kenyatta, who
is scheduled to stand trial at the court in July. Museveni claimed unnamed states have sought
to abuse the ICC for their own agenda.” See also Tom Maliti, Ugandan President attacks ICC
during Kenyatta inauguration, INT’L JUSTICE MONITOR (Apr. 9, 2013),
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/04/ugandan-president-attacks-icc-during-kenyattainauguration/. See also AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Werle, et. al.
eds., 2014) (providing the most comprehensive treatment of this important topic with a range
of useful contributions by leading experts in the field of international criminal justice).
304. Museveni Attacks ICC at UN Summit in New York, INSIDER (Kampala) (Sept. 25,
2013), http://www.theinsider.ug/museveni-attacks-icc-at-un-summit-in-new-york/.
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It should require that all UPDF criminal offenses be
heard by a general court martial, also supported by ICC
staff and with ICC trial judges in an observer status (i.e.,
a mentoring role)



The combined tribunals should be based in the ICTY
court spaces in Arusha, Tanzania with court security
provided by the ICC or a named third party



All appellate issues should be addressed through the
Ugandan appellate processes, with ICC judges in an
observer status for any such proceedings



It should address all criminal offenses committed in
violation of the Ugandan Penal Code, the UPDF Act
(such as arms and uniform violations by LRA members
or war crimes by the UPDF), or IHL over the course of
the Uganda-LRA conflict from January 1, 1990, to the
present and continuing



It should apply the extra-territoriality (universal
jurisdiction) provisions of Ugandan law as it applies to
any crimes committed in southern Sudan, the DRC, or
the CAR



It should address all crimes committed by the named
LRA defendants presently under indictment by the
ICC,305 as well as any other named senior officers of the
LRA or the UPDF, as identified by the ICC



It should use the evidence, to include witnesses and
documents, provided by the ICC



It should exclude the application of Uganda Amnesty
Law



It should exclude the application of the death penalty
under Ugandan law, with the sentencing limited to a
term of years or life imprisonment, as provided for under
Article 77 of the Rome Statute



It should not recognize any defense of immunity



It should provide for the costs of witness travel and
protection
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305. The ICC would not necessarily have to rescind the existing indictments; the ICC
could simply deputize the combined tribunal to hear the matter as if it were the ICC, thus
preserving the integrity of the original indictments while bolstering the new tribunal.
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Its proceedings should be open to members of the press

There are also four important practical issues that must be
considered with this tribunal. Initially, Uganda will likely have to
amend both the 2005 UPDF Act and the 2010 ICC Act to ensure that
the agreement has parliamentary approval and to avoid any
unnecessary complications under Ugandan law. In one example, the
commitment to prosecute named individuals could be considered
inconsistent with the DPP’s prosecutorial discretion. 306 In a second
example, the presence of ICC observers, staffing, and support could
be construed as impairing the independence of the Ugandan
judiciary. 307 Thus, parliamentary approval would facilitate clear
working relationships between ICC and Ugandan officials.
Second, the tribunal should use the evidence accumulated from
the ICC’s investigation of the cases over the past ten years. The ICC
has performed commendable work in investigating the conflict, at
least from the start of its jurisdiction in July of 2002. The ICC’s
investigators, as well as the body of reliable evidence that it has
amassed, have considerable credibility over the Ugandan Police,
JATT, and other domestic law enforcement organizations. This
should help ensure a fair trial for the defendants untainted by any
claims about incompetent, corrupt, or abusive Ugandan law
enforcement practices that have previously raised alarms in the
international community. This should also reassure skeptical
audiences that any offenses committed by the UPDF are not simply
whitewashed over.
Third, there should be cost-sharing between the ICC and the
Ugandan government. Based upon the experiences of earlier
international criminal tribunals, it could take the ICC-Uganda tribunal
two to five years to try each case. Still, with support from the ICC
judges and staff, Uganda should be able to prosecute the cases much
faster than it would otherwise if left to its own devices. Thus, ICC
funding could be used to hire and train additional court staff, provide
306. The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda provides that: “In the exercise of the
functions conferred on him or her by this article, the Director of Public Prosecutions shall not
be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority. CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, supra note 87, art. 120(6).
307. Id. art. 128 (stating “(1) In the exercise of judicial power, the courts shall be
independent and shall not be subject to the control or direction of any person or authority. (2)
No person or authority shall interfere with the courts or judicial officers in the exercise of their
judicial functions”).
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for improved record-keeping and evidence tracking systems, and
ensure witness availability and protection.
Fourth, this hybrid tribunal should be located in the ICTY court
in Arusha, Tanzania. Thus, the court would be based in the region and
help draw African support. It would give the hybrid court ready
access to witnesses and evidence, while at the same time allowing
ready access to observers to its proceedings. While there would be
some advantage to Kampala-based proceedings, to include ease of
access to Ugandan victims and witnesses, the use of ICTY facilities
would provide for better court security and give the court more
control over its own proceedings while avoiding any corruption or
outside political interference. Indeed, as Naluwairo indicated, Uganda
lacks “alternative special or high-security civilian courts.”308 In short,
an Arusha-based tribunal would be more focused on the issues at
hand, as opposed to one based in Kampala and open to outside
pressures, and more accessible to African observers and witnesses, as
opposed to one based at the Hague and less accessible to interested
parties.
This approach would provide the ICC with an opportunity to
support national prosecutions under international standards for a fair
trial. While the ICC-Uganda tribunal might only prosecute a limited
number of persons, it could enhance Uganda’s capacity to handle
complex criminal cases and ensure a fair trial through effective
international oversight.
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The Uganda-LRA conflict is best characterized as a noninternational armed conflict between an “organized armed group” and
the GoU, at least until December of 2008—after which time the
UPDF has been conducting counter-terrorism operations against a
308. Naluwairo, supra note 103, at 179-80. It is also noteworthy that Uganda’s lead
prosecutor for the high-profile trial of the thirteen terrorists accused of taking part in the July
2010 bombing of the Ethiopian Village Restaurant was murdered in Kampala. See also AFP,
Uganda Attacks Trial Resumes after Murder of Prosecutor, DAILY MAIL (Kampala) (June 8,
2015),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3115391/Uganda-attacks-trial-resumesmurder-prosecutor.html. One would expect that a joint ICC-Uganda trial involving high profile
defendants from the LRA and the government could generate even greater security
requirements. See, for example, the treatment meted out against Dr. Besigye and his codefendants in the November 2005 and March 2007 court sieges. Besigye & Others v. Attorney
General, supra note 186.
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criminal organization. This unique group, while it has origins as a
rebel/insurgent organization, has committed a wide-ranging terror
campaign over the past twenty years that has resulted in the death or
mutilation of perhaps 100,000 civilians, in the kidnapping of tens of
thousands of children for use as soldiers or sex slaves, in the theft or
destruction of civilian property, and in the displacement of millions
from their homes. While there have been a limited number of claims
regarding offenses committed by the UPDF, these claims involve
events that occurred largely in the 1990s. Uganda has an obligation to
bring all culpable persons, either LRA or UPDF, to account for the
full range of offenses under both international and national law.
Despite the broad coverage provided by Uganda criminal law,
there are significant drawbacks to its use against unprivileged
belligerents.309 First, Uganda’s courts lack the experience trying cases
involving war crimes and many ethnic groups in Uganda, especially
the Acholi, do not trust Museveni’s government. Uganda’s limited
experience with war crimes cases would only be compounded by the
complexity of international law issues. Second, the LRA depredations
have occurred over a protracted period encompassing parts of four
countries, each country having varying obligations under international
law. This means that while Uganda may have considerable evidence
against the LRA and its members for offenses committed in Uganda,
it will have difficulty gathering some evidence and foreign witnesses
for trials in Ugandan courts based on offenses committed in either the
DRC or the CAR. Third, there is some complexity in the international
norms regarding war crimes, as well as the appropriate punishments
thereto (e.g., the death penalty), committed by children.
This conflict calls for justice and accountability measures which
would be best administered through an impartial, international
tribunal with the broad ranging expertise and resources that could
provide closure to the victims while promoting international peace
and security in a war-torn region. A Ugandan tribunal, with direct
assistance by ICC judges and staff, could serve to legitimize the role,
functions and work of the ICC to date, enhance the capacity of
Uganda legal institutions, and enhance the prospects for peace and
accountability throughout the Great Lakes Region.
309 . Isaac Mufumba. ICC Bill: Why did MPs trap Museveni and save Kony?,
INDEPENDENT (Kampala) (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.independent.co.ug/column/in
sight/2702-icc-bill-why-did-mps-trap-museveni-and-save-kony.

